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1Abstract
The wiretap channel has been devised and studied first by Wyner, and subsequently extended
to the case with non-degraded general wiretap channels by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner. Focusing mainly on
the stationary memoryless channel with cost constraint, we newly introduce the notion of reliability
and secrecy functions as a fundamental tool to analyze and/or design the performance of an efficient
wiretap channel system, including binary symmetric wiretap channels, Poisson wiretap channels and
Gaussian wiretap channels. Compact formulae for those functions are explicitly given for stationary
memoryless wiretap channels. It is also demonstrated that, based on such a pair of reliability and
secrecy functions, we can control the tradeoff between reliability and secrecy (usually conflicting),
both with exponentially decreasing rates as block length n becomes large. Four ways to do so are
given on the basis of rate shifting, rate exchange, concatenation and change of cost constraint. Also,
the notion of the δ secrecy capacity is defined and shown to attain the strongest secrecy standard
among others. The maximized vs. averaged secrecy measures is also discussed.
Index Terms
reliability function, secrecy function, secrecy measures, Poisson wiretap channel, cost constraint,
Gaussian wiretap channel, binary symmetric wiretap channel, tradeoff between reliability and secrecy,
concatenation, rate shifting, rate exchange, change of cost constraint
1. INTRODUCTION
The pioneering work by Wyner [1] as well as by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [2], based on the wiretap channel
model, has provided a strong impetus to find a new scheme of the physical layer cryptography
in a good balance of usability and secrecy. In particular, they have first formulated the tradeoff
between the transmission rate for Bob and the equivocation rate against Eve. Since then, “information
theoretic security attracts much attention, because it offers security that does not depend on conjectured
difficulties of some computational problem, ” ∗ and there have been extensive studies on various
kinds of wiretap channels, which are nicely summarized, e.g., in Laourine and Wagner [3] along
with the secrecy capacity formula for the Poisson wiretap channel without cost constraint. Among
others, Hayashi [4] is the first who has derived the relevant secrecy exponent function to specify the
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2exponentially decreasing speed (i.e., exponent) of the leaked information under the average secrecy
criterion when no cost constraint is considered.
Throughout in this paper, we are imposed cost constraints (limit on available transmission energy,
bandwidth, and so on). We first address, given a general wiretap channel, the primal problem to
establish a general formula to simultaneously summarize the reliability performance for Bob and the
secrecy performance against Eve under the maximum secrecy criterion. Next, it is shown that both of
them are described by using exponentially decaying functions of the code length when a stationary
memoryless wiretap channel is considered. This provides the theoretical basis for investigating the
asymptotic behavior of reliability and secrecy. We can then specifically quantify achievable reliability
exponents and achievable secrecy exponents as well as the tradeoff between them for several impor-
tant wiretap channel models such as binary symmetric wiretap channels, Poisson wiretap channels,
Gaussian wiretap channels. In particular, four ways of the tradeoff to control reliability and secrecy are
given and discussed with their novel significance. Also, on the basis of the analysis of these exponents
under cost constraint, the new formula for the δ-secrecy capacity (with the strongest secrecy among
others) is established to apply to several typical wiretap channel models. A remarkable feature of this
paper is that we first derive the key formulas not depending on respective specific channel models
and then apply them to those respective cases to get new insights into each case as well.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the definitions of wiretap channel and related notions
such as error probability, cost constraint, secrecy capacity and concatenation are introduced along
with various kinds of secrecy measures.
In Section 3.A, we give a fundamental formula to simultaneously evaluate a pair of reliability behavior
and secrecy behavior under cost constraint for a general wiretap channel, which is then in Section 3.B,
particularized to establish the specific formulas for stationary and memoryless wiretap channels. Here,
the notions of reliability function and secrecy function are introduced to evaluate the exponent of the
exponentially decreasing decoding error for Bob and that of the exponentially decreasing divergence
distance against Eve for the stationary memoryless wiretap channel under cost constraint. This is one
of the key results in this paper. We also present their numerical examples to see how the reliability
and secrecy exponents vary depending on the channel and cost parameters. Also, superiority of the
maximum secrecy criterion to the average secrecy criterion is discussed. In Section 3.C, a strengthening
of Theorem 3.3 in Section 3.B is provided. In Section 3.D, the δ-secrecy capacity formula (with the
strongest secrecy) is given under cost constraint, including the formula for a special but important
3case with more capable wiretap channels.
In Section 4, four ways for the tradeoff are demonstrated: one is by rate shifting, another one by rate
exchange, one more by concatenation, and the other by change of cost constraint, which are discussed
in terms of the reliability and secrecy exponents. This section is thus prepared for more quantitative
analysis/design of the reliability-secrecy tradeoff.
In Section 5, the formula for the δ-secrecy capacity is applied to the Poisson wiretap channel with
cost constraint, which is a practical model for free-space Laser communication with a photon counter.
In Section 6, for Poisson wiretap channels with cost constraint we demonstrate the reliability and
secrecy functions as an application of the key theorem established in Section 3.B.
In Section 7, we investigate the effects of channel concatenation with an auxiliary channel for the
Poisson wiretap channel.
In Section 8, the δ-secrecy capacity formula for the Gaussian wiretap channel is given as an application
of the key theorem established in Section 3.D.
In Section 9, for the Gaussian wiretap channels with cost constraint we demonstrate the reliability
and secrecy functions as an application of the key theorem established in Section 3.B. In particular,
these functions are numerically compared with those of Gallager-type, which reveals that a kind of
duality exists among them. In Section 10, we conclude the paper.
2. PRELIMINARIES AND BASIC CONCEPTS
In this section we give the definition of the wiretap channel. There are several levels and ways to
specify the superiority of the legitimate users, Alice and Bob, to the eavesdropper, Eve, such as
physically degraded Eve, (statistically) degraded Eve, less noisy Bob, and more capable Bob. In this
paper, we are interested mainly in the last class of channels because the other ones imply the last one
(cf. Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [9]).
We introduce here the necessary notions and notations to quantify the reliability and the secrecy of
this kind of wiretap channel model. In particular, we define several kinds of secrecy metrics, including
the strongest criterion based on the divergence distance with reference to a target output distribution,
while the notion of concatenation of channels is also introduced to construct a possible way to control
tradeoff between reliability and secrecy.
A. Wiretap channel
4Let X ,Y ,Z be arbitrary alphabets (not necessarily finite), where X is called an input alphabet, and
Y ,Z are called output alphabets. A general wiretap channel consists of two general channels, i.e.,
WnB : Xn → Yn (from Alice for Bob) and WnE : Xn → Zn (from Alice against Eve), where
WnB(y|x), WnE(z|x) are the conditional probabilities of y ∈ Yn, z ∈ Zn given x ∈ Xn (of block
length n), respectively. Alice wants to communicate with Bob as reliably as possible but as secretly
as possible against Eve. We let (WnB ,WnE) indicate such a wiretap channel.
Given a message set Mn ≡ {1, 2, · · · ,Mn}, we consider a stochastic encoder for Alice ϕn :Mn →
Xn and a decoder for Bob ψBn : Yn → Mn, and for i ∈ Mn let ϕBn (i) denote the output due to
ϕn(i) via channel WnB .
B. Cost constraint
From the viewpoint of communication technologies, it is sometimes needed to impose cost constraint
on channel inputs. Here we give its formal definition.
For n = 1, 2, · · · fix a mapping cn : Xn → R+ (the set of nonnegative real numbers) arbitrarily. For
x ∈ Xn we call cn(x) the cost of x and 1ncn(x) the cost per letter. In the channel coding problem
with cost constraint, we require the encoder outputs ϕn(i) ∈ Xn satisfy
Pr
{
1
n
cn(ϕn(i)) ≤ Γ
}
= 1 (for all i = 1, 2, · · · ,Mn), (2.1)
where Γ is an arbitrarily nonnegative given constant, which we call cost constraint Γ. Notice here
that the encoder ϕn is stochastic. When (2.1) holds, we say that the encoder ϕn satisfies the cost
constraint Γ and call (WnB ,WnE) a wiretap channel with cost constraint Γ. Incidentally, define
Xn(Γ) =
{
x ∈ Xn
∣∣∣∣ 1ncn(x) ≤ Γ
}
, (2.2)
then (2.1) is rewritten also as
Pr {ϕn(i) ∈ Xn(Γ)} = 1 (for all i = 1, 2, · · · ,Mn). (2.3)
Remark 2.1: Consider the case with cn(x) = n (∀x ∈ Xn) and Γ = 1, then in this case it is easy to
check that Xn(Γ) = Xn, which means that the wiretap channel is actually imposed no cost constraint.
C. Error probability, secrecy measures and secrecy capacities
5Given a wiretap channel (WnB ,WnE) with cost constraint Γ, the error probability ǫBn (measure of
reliability) via channel WnB for Bob is defined to be
ǫBn ≡
1
Mn
∑
i∈Mn
Pr
{
ψBn (ϕ
B
n (i)) 6= i
}
, (2.4)
whereas the divergence distance (measure 1 of secrecy) δEn and the variational distance (measure 2
of secrecy) ∂En via channel WnE against Eve are defined to be
δEn ≡
1
Mn
∑
i∈Mn
D(P (i)n ||πn), (2.5)
∂En ≡
1
Mn
∑
i∈Mn
d(P (i)n , πn) (2.6)
where
D(P1||P2) =
∑
u∈U
P1(u) log
P1(u)
P2(u)
,
d(P1, P2) =
∑
u∈U
|P1(u)− P2(u)|;
where P (i)n denotes the output probability distribution on Zn via channel WnE due to the input ϕn(i),
and πn is called the target output probability distribution on Zn, which is generated via channel
WnE due to an arbitrarily prescribed input distribution on Xn. Specifically, πn is given by πn(z) =∑
x∈Xn W
n(z|x)PXn(x). In this paper the logarithm is taken to the natural base e.
With these two typical measures of secrecy, we can define two kinds of criteria for achievability:
ǫBn → 0, δEn → 0 as n→∞, (2.7)
ǫBn → 0, ∂En → 0 as n→∞. (2.8)
We say that a rate R is (δ,Γ)-achievable if there exists a pair (ϕn, ψBn ) of encoder and decoder
satisfying criterion (2.7) and
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
logMn ≥ R. (2.9)
When there is no fear of confusion, we say simply that a rate R is δ-achievable by dropping cost
constraint Γ, and so on also in the sequel. Similarly, we say that a rate R is (∂,Γ)-achievable if there
exists a pair (ϕn, ψBn ) of encoder and decoder satisfying criterion (2.8) and (2.9). It should be noted
here that criterion (2.7) implies criterion (2.8), owing to Pinsker inequality [10]:
(
∂En
)2 ≤ 2δEn ,
6which means that criterion (2.7) is stronger than criterion (2.8).
On the other hand, many people (e.g., Csisza´r [7], Hayashi [4]) have used, instead of measure (2.5),
the mutual information:
IEn ≡
1
Mn
∑
i∈Mn
D(P (i)n ||Pn), Pn =
1
Mn
∑
i∈Mn
P (i)n . (2.10)
With this measure (measure 3 of secrecy), we may consider one more criterion for achievability (called
the i-achievability):
ǫBn → 0, IEn → 0 as n→∞. (2.11)
On the other hand, since the identity (Pythagorean theorem):
δEn = I
E
n +D(Pn||πn) (2.12)
holds, δEn is a stronger measure than IEn . Moreover, since
dEn ≡
1
Mn
∑
i∈Mn
d(P (i)n , Pn) ≤
2
Mn
∑
i∈Mn
d(P (i)n , πn) = 2∂
E
n
always holds by virtue of the triangle axiom of the variational distance, ∂En is stronger than dEn
(measure 4 of secrecy: cf. [7]), so that criterion (2.8) is stronger than the d-achievability:
ǫBn → 0, dEn → 0 as n→∞. (2.13)
Furthermore, one may sometimes prefer to consider the following achievability (called the w-achievability):
ǫBn → 0,
1
n
IEn → 0 as n→∞, (2.14)
which is nothing but the so-called weak secrecy (measure 5 of secrecy). Indeed, this is the weakest
criterion among others; its illustrating example will appear in Examples 5.1 and 8.1, while criterion
(2.7) is the strongest one and introduced for the first time in this paper. Fig.1 shows the implication
scheme among these five measures of secrecy.
The secrecy capacities δ-Cs(Γ) and ∂-Cs(Γ) between Alice and Bob are defined to be the supremum
of all (δ,Γ)-achievable rates and that of all (∂,Γ)-achievable rates, respectively. Similarly, the secrecy
capacity d-Cs(Γ) with d-achievability, the secrecy capacity i-Cs(Γ) with i-achievability as well as the
secrecy capacity w-Cs(Γ) with w-achievability can also be defined.
Remark 2.2: One may wonder if the “strongest” measure δEn of secrecy can be given an operational
meaning. In this connection, we would like to cite the paper by Hou and Kramer [8] in which IEn
7Fig. 1. The implication scheme: The arrow α −→ β means that α is stronger than β; α L9999K β means that α coincides
with β when πn = Pn, where IEn → dEn is due to [10] and dEn → 1nIEn is due to [14]. In the finite alphabet case, exponential
decay of dEn (with increasing n) implies that of IEn (cf. [7]).
is interpreted as a measure of “non-confusion” and D(Pn||πn) as a measure of “non-stealth,” and
πn is interpreted as the background noise distribution on Zn that Eve detects in advance to the
communication between Alice and Bob; thus, in view of (2.12), by making δEn → 0 we can not only
keep the message secret from Eve but also hide the presence of meaningful communication. Alice can
control πn so as to be most perplexng to Eve. A connection to some hypothesis testing problem is also
pointed out. A similar interpretation is given also for ∂En with dEn as a measure of “non-confusion”
and d(Pn, πn) as a measure of “non-stealth,” because the following inequality holds:
dEn + d(Pn, πn) ≤ 3∂En . (2.15)
Remark 2.3: We notice that all of ǫBn , δEn , ∂En , dEn and IEn , 1nI
E
n defined here are the measures
averaged over the message set Mn with the uniform distribution. On the other hand, we can consider
also the criteria maximized over the message set Mn, which will be discussed later in Remark 3.9.
D. Concatenation
In wiretap channel coding it is one of the important problems how to control the tradeoff between
the reliability for Bob and the secrecy against Eve. There are several ways to control it. One of these
is to make use of the concatenation of the main wiretap channel with an auxiliary (virtual) channel.
So, it is convenient to state here its formal definition for later use.
Let V be an arbitrary alphabet (not necessarily finite) and let V n be an arbitrary auxiliary random
8variable with values in Vn such that V n → Xn → Y nZn forms a Markov chain in this order, where
Xn is an input variable for the wiretap channel (WnB ,WnE); and Y n, Zn are the output variables of
channels WnB,WnE due to the input Xn, respectively.
Definition 2.1: Given a general channel Wn : Xn → Yn, we define its concatenated channel Wn+ :
Vn → Yn so that
Wn+(y|v) =
∑
x∈Xn
Wn(y|x)PXn|V n(x|v), (2.16)
where † PXn|V n : Vn → Xn is an arbitrary auxiliary channel. In particular, we say that a pair
(Wn+B ,W
n+
E ) is a concatenation of the wiretap channel (WnB,WnE), if
Wn+B (y|v) =
∑
x∈Xn
WnB(y|x)PXn|V n(x|v) (2.17)
Wn+E (z|v) =
∑
x∈Xn
WnE(z|x)PXn|V n(x|v). (2.18)
with the auxiliary channel PXn|V n . Notice that if V n ≡ Xn as random variables then these reduce
to the non-concenated wiretap channel.
E. Stationary memoryless wiretap channel
In this paper the substantial attention is payed to the special class of wiretap channels called the
stationary memoryless wiretap channel, the definition of which is given by
Definition 2.2: A wiretap channel (WnB,WnE) is said to be stationary and memoryless if, with some
channels WB : X → Y ,WE : X → Z , it holds that
WnB(y|x) =
n∏
k=1
WB(yk|xk), WnE(z|x) =
n∏
k=1
WE(zk|xk), (2.19)
where x = (x1, x2, · · · , xn), y = (y1, y2, · · · , yn), z = (z1, z2, · · · , zn). This wiretap channel may be
denoted simply by (WB,WE).
When we are dealing with a stationary memoryless wiretap channel (WB,WE) it is usual to assume
an additive cost c : X → R+ in the sense that cn(x) =
∑n
i=1 c(xi) where x = (x1, · · · , xn). This
enables us to analyze the detailed performances of the wiretap channel, to be shown in the following
sections.
†We use the convention that, given random variables S and T , PS(·) and PS|T (·|·) denote the probability distribution of
S, and the conditional probability distribution of S given T , respectively
93. EVALUATION OF RELIABILITY AND SECRECY
In this section, the problem of a general wiretap channel with general cost constraint Γ is first studied,
and next the problem of a stationary memoryless wiretap channel with additive cost constraint Γ is
investigated in details. In particular, with criterion (2.7) we are interested in exponentially decreasing
rates of ǫBn , δEn as n tends to ∞. Finally, its applicantion to establish a general formula for the δ-secrecy
capacity δ-Cs(Γ) with cost constraint is provided.
A. General wiretap channel with cost constraint
Let Wn(y|v) : Vn → Yn, Wn(z|v) : Vn → Zn be arbitrary general channels and Q(v) be an
arbitrary auxiliary input distribution on Vn, and set
φ(ρ|Wn, Q) ≡ − log
∑
y
(∑
v
Q(v)Wn(y|v) 11+ρ
)1+ρ
, (3.1)
ψ(ρ|Wn, Q) ≡ − log
∑
z
(∑
v
Q(v)Wn(z|v)1+ρ
)
WnQ(z)
−ρ, (3.2)
where WnQ(z) =
∑
v
Q(v)Wn(z|v). Then, we have
Theorem 3.1: Let (WnB,WnE) be a general wiretap channel with general cost constraint Γ, and Mn, Ln
be arbitrary positive integers, then there exists a pair (ϕn, ψBn ) of encoder (satisfying cost constraint
Γ) and decoder such that
ǫBn ≤ 2 inf
0≤ρ≤1
(MnLn)
ρe−φ(ρ|W
n+
B ,Q), (3.3)
δEn ≤ 2 inf
0<ρ≤1
e−ψ(ρ|W
n+
E ,Q)
ρLρn
(3.4)
≤ 2 inf
0<ρ<1
e−φ(−ρ|W
n+
E ,Q)
ρLρn
, (3.5)
where (Wn+B ,W
n+
E ) is a concatenation of (WnB ,WnE) (cf. Definition 2.1), and we assume that the
condition
Pr{Xn ∈ Xn(Γ)} = 1 (3.6)
holds for the random variable Xn over Xn induced via the auxiliary channel PXn|V n by the input
variable V n subject to Q(v) on Vn.
Proof: See Appendix A.
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Remark 3.1: Formula (3.3) without concatenation is due to Gallager [11], while formulas (3.4), (3.5)
without concatenation and cost constraint have first been shown in a different context by Han and
Verdu´ [13, p.768] based on a simple random coding argument, and subsequently developed by Hayashi
[4] based on a universal hashing argument to establish the cryptographic implication of channel
resolvability (see, also Hayashi [6]).
Remark 3.2: We define the rates RB = 1n logMn and RE =
1
n
logLn, which is called the coding
rate for Bob and the resolvability rate against Eve, respectively. Rate RB is quite popular in channel
coding, whereas rate RE , roughly speaking, indicates the rate of a large dice with Ln faces to provide
randomness needed to implement an efficient stochastic encoder ϕn to deceive Eve.
Remark 3.3: In view of (3.6), the concatenated channels Wn+B (y|v),Wn+E (z|v) as defined by (2.17)
and (2.18) can be written as
Wn+B (y|v) =
∑
x∈Xn(Γ)
WnB(y|x)PXn|V n(x|v), (3.7)
Wn+E (z|v) =
∑
x∈Xn(Γ)
WnE(z|x)PXn|V n(x|v). (3.8)
The reason why we have introduced the concatenated channelWn+(y|v) instead of the non-concatenated
channel Wn(y|x) can be seen from the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2 (Tradeoff of reliability and secrecy by concatenation): Concatenation decreases reliabil-
ity for Bob and increases secrecy against Eve.
Proof: The quantity An ≡ e−φ(ρ|Wn+B ,Q) in (3.3) is lower bounded, by concavity of the function
f(x) = x
1
1+ρ , as
An =
∑
y

∑
v
Q(v)
(∑
x
PXn|V n(x|v)WnB(y|x)
) 1
1+ρ


1+ρ
(3.9)
≥
∑
y
(∑
v
∑
x
Q(v)PXn|V n(x|v)WnB(y|x)
1
1+ρ
)1+ρ
(3.10)
=
∑
y
(∑
x
P (x)WnB(y|x)
1
1+ρ
)1+ρ
, (3.11)
where P (x) =
∑
v
Q(v)PXn|V n(x|v). This implies that concatenation decreases reliability for the
channel for Bob. On the other hand, the quantity Bn ≡ e−φ(−ρ|Wn+E ,Q) in (3.5) is upper bounded, by
11
convexity of the function g(x) = x
1
1−ρ , as
Bn =
∑
z

∑
v
Q(v)
(∑
x
PXn|V n(x|v)WnE(z|x)
) 1
1−ρ


1−ρ
(3.12)
≤
∑
z
(∑
v
∑
x
Q(v)PXn|V n(x|v)WnE(z|x)
1
1−ρ
)1−ρ
(3.13)
=
∑
z
(∑
x
P (x)WnE(z|x)
1
1−ρ
)1−ρ
, (3.14)
which implies that concatenation increases secrecy against the channel for Eve. Thus, we can control
the tradeoff between reliability and secrecy (usually conflicting) by adequate choice of an auxiliary
channel PXn|V n (e.g., see Fig.4 later for the case of stationary memoryless wiretap channels). Fur-
thermore, it should be noted that Cn ≡ e−ψ(ρ|Wn+E ,Q) in (3.4) also has such a nice tradeoff property
like in the above, owing to the convexity in WnE(z|x).
B. Stationary memoryless wiretap channel with cost constraint
So far we have studied the performance of general wiretap channels with general cost constraint Γ.
Suppose now that we are given a stationary and memoryless wiretap channel (WnB ,WnE), specified
by (WB ≡ PY |X ,WE ≡ PZ|X), with additive cost c : X → R+. With this important class of
channels, we attempt to bring out specific useful insights on the basis of Theorem 3.1. To do so, let
us consider the case in which V nXn = (V1X1, · · · , VnXn) are i.i.d. variables with common joint
distribution
PXV (x, v) ((v, x) ∈ V × X ), (3.15)
then, the probabilities of Xn and V n, and the conditional probability of Xn given V n are written
as
PXn(x) =
n∏
i=1
PX(xi), (3.16)
PV n(v) =
n∏
i=1
PV (vi), (3.17)
PXn|V n(x|v) =
n∏
i=1
PX|V (xi|vi), (3.18)
respectively, where
x = (x1, · · · , xn), v = (v1, · · · , vn).
12
It should be noted here that V n indicates a channel input for (Wn+B ,W
n+
E ), and Xn indicates a
channel input for (WnB,WnE). Accordingly, these specifications define a joint probability distribution
PV XY Z on V × X × Y ×Z . Also, the concatenated channel in this case is written simply as
W+B (y|v) =
∑
x∈X
WB(y|x)PX|V (x|v), (3.19)
W+E (z|v) =
∑
x∈X
WE(z|x)PX|V (x|v). (3.20)
Then, we have one of the key results:
Theorem 3.3: Let (WnB,WnE) be a stationary memoryless wiretap channel with additive cost c :
X → R+. Let PV XY Z be a joint probability distribution as above, and suppose that the constraint∑
x∈X PX(x)c(x) ≤ Γ on PX is satisfied. Then, for any positive integers Mn, Ln, there exists a pair
(ϕn, ψ
B
n ) of encoder (satisfying cost constraint Γ) and decoder such that
ǫBn ≤
2
α1+ρn βn
(MnLn)
ρ
·

∑
y∈Y

∑
v∈V
q(v)
[∑
x∈X
WB(y|x)PX|V (x|v)e(1+ρ)r[Γ−c(x)]
] 1
1+ρ


1+ρ


n
(3.21)
and
δEn ≤
2
α1−ρn βn
1
ρLρn
·

∑
z∈Z

∑
v∈V
q(v)
[∑
x∈X
WE(z|x)PX|V (x|v)e(1−ρ)r[Γ−c(x)]
] 1
1−ρ


1−ρ


n
,
(3.22)
where we have put q = PV for simplicity, and 0 ≤ αn, βn ≤ 1 are the constants such that
lim infn→∞ αn ≥ limn→∞ βn = 1 or 1− 1/
√
2 to be specified in the proof.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Remark 3.4 (Two secrecy functions): So far, we have established evaluation of upper bounds (3.3)
and (3.5) when the channel (WnB,WnE) is stationary and memoryless under cost constraint. It should
be noted, however, that we did not evaluate upper bound (3.4). This is because (3.4) contains the term
13
WnQ(z) with negative power −ρ, and hence upper bounding for (3.4) does not work. Thus, we prefer
bound (3.5) rather than bound (3.4).
Remark 3.5: Instead of upper bound (B.8) (in the proof of Theorem 3.3) on the characteristic function
χ(x), i.e., the upper bound
χ(x) ≤ exp
[
(1 + ρ)r
(
nΓ−
n∑
i=1
c(xi)
)]
, (3.23)
Gallager [11] used the upper bound
χ(x) ≤ exp
[
(1 + ρ)r
(
n∑
i=1
c(xi)− nΓ + δ
)]
, (3.24)
where δ > 0 is an arbitrary small constant. Wyner [15] also used upper bound (3.24) for Poisson
channels. However, we prefer upper bound (3.23) in this paper (except for in Theorems 9.2 and 9.4
later in Section 9), because it provides us with reasonable evaluation of the reliability and secrecy
functions for binary symmetric wiretap channels, for Poisson wiretap channels and also for Gaussian
wiretap channels to be treated in this section and in Sections 6, 7 and 9.
Let us now give more compact forms to (3.21) and (3.22). To do so, let us define a reliability exponent
function (or simply, reliability function) Fc(q,RB , RE , n) for Bob, and a secrecy exponent function
(or simply, secrecy function) Hc(q, ρ,RE , n) against Eve, as ‡
Fc(q,RB , RE , n)
≡ sup
r≥0
sup
0≤ρ≤1
(
φ(ρ|WB , q, r) − ρ(RB + RE) + log(αnβ
1+ρ
n )− ρ log 3
n
)
,
(3.25)
Hc(q,RE , n)
≡ sup
r≥0
sup
0<ρ<1
(
φ(−ρ|WE , q, r) + ρRE + log(αnβ
1−ρ
n ) + log ρ
n
)
,
(3.26)
‡In the theory of channel coding it is the tradition to use the terminology “reliability functionn” to denote the “optimal”
one. Therefore, more exactly, it might be recommended to use the term such as “achievable reliability exponent (function)”
and “achievable secrecy exponent (function),” because here we lack the converse results. However, in this paper, simply for
convenience with some abuse of the notation, we do not stick to the optimality and prefer to use their shorthands, because
in most cases the optimal computable formula is not known. Then, the term “optimal reliability function” with the converse
makes sense. Similarly for the “secrecy function.”
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where for fixed rates RB , RE we have set Mn = enRB , Ln = enRE , and
φ(ρ|WB , q, r)
= − log

∑
y∈Y

∑
v∈V
q(v)
[∑
x∈X
WB(y|x)PX|V (x|v)e(1+ρ)r[Γ−c(x)]
] 1
1+ρ


1+ρ

 ,
(3.27)
φ(−ρ|WE , q, r)
= − log

∑
z∈Z

∑
v∈V
q(v)
[∑
x∈X
WE(z|x)PX|V (x|v)e(1−ρ)r[Γ−c(x)]
] 1
1−ρ


1−ρ

 .
(3.28)
Thus, we have
Theorem 3.4: Let (WnB,WnE) be a stationary memoryless wiretap channel with additive cost constraint
Γ, then there exists a pair (ϕn, ψBn ) of encoder (satisfying cost constraint Γ) and decoder such that
ǫBn ≤ 2e−nFc(q,RB ,RE,n), (3.29)
δEn ≤ 2e−nHc(q,RE,n). (3.30)
where it is assumed that PX satisfies
∑
x∈X PX(x)c(x) ≤ Γ.
Remark 3.6 (Reliability and secrecy functions): The function Fc(q,RB , RE , n) quantifies performance
of channel coding (called the random coding exponent of Gallager [11]), whereas the function Hc(q,RE, n)
quantifies performance of channel resolvability (cf. Han and Verdu´ [13], Han [12], Hayashi [4], [6]).
Remark 3.7: It should be noted that, the third term in Fc(q,RB , RE , n) on the right-hand side of
(3.25) and the third term in Hc(q,RE , n) on the right-hand of (3.26) is both of the order O( 1n),
which approach zero as n tends to ∞, so that these terms do not affect the exponents. Actually, the
term ρ log 3
n
on the right-hand side of (3.25) is not needed here but is needed in Fc(q,RB , RE , n) on
the right-hand side of (3.35) to follow under the maximum criterion.
Remark 3.8 (Non-concatenation): It is sometimes useful to consider the special case with V ≡ X
as random variables over V = X . In this case the above quantities φ(ρ|WB , q, r), φ(−ρ|WE , q, r)
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(q = PX ) reduce to
φ(ρ|WB , q, r) = − log

∑
y∈Y
(∑
x∈X
q(x)WB(y|x)
1
1+ρ er[Γ−c(x)]
)1+ρ ,
(3.31)
φ(−ρ|WE , q, r) = − log

∑
z∈Z
(∑
x∈X
q(x)WE(z|x)
1
1−ρ er[Γ−c(x)]
)1−ρ ,
(3.32)
where the reliability function with (3.31) with c(x)−Γ instead of Γ−c(x) is earlier found in Gallager
[11] and (3.31) with c(x)−Γ instead of Γ− c(x) applied to Poisson channels is found in Wyner [15],
while the secrecy function with (3.32) intervenes for the first time in this paper.
Recall that, so far, upper bounds on the error probability ǫBn and the divergence distance δEn are based
on the averaged criteria as mentioned in Section 1.C. Alternatively, instead of the averaged criteria
ǫBn and δEn , we can define the maximum criteria m-ǫBn and m-δEn as follows.
m-ǫBn ≡ max
i∈Mn
Pr{ψBn (ϕBn (i)) 6= i}, (3.33)
m-δEn ≡ max
i∈Mn
D(P (i)n ||πn). (3.34)
With these criteria, using Markov inequality § applied to (3.29) and (3.30), we obtain, instead of
Theorem 3.4,
Theorem 3.5: Let (WnB,WnE) be a stationary memoryless wiretap channel with additive cost constraint
Γ, then there exists a pair (ϕn, ψBn ) of encoder (satisfying cost constraint Γ) and decoder such that
m-ǫBn ≤ 6e−nFc(q,RB,RE,n), (3.35)
m-δEn ≤ 6e−nHc(q,RE ,n), (3.36)
where it is assumed that PX satisfies
∑
x∈X PX(x)c(x) ≤ Γ.
§Set ǫBn (i) = Pr{ψBn (ϕBn (i)), δEn (i) = D(P (i)n ||πn), then Markov inequality tells that #{i|ǫBn (i) ≤ 3ǫBn } ≥ 2Mn/3
and #{i|δEn (i) ≤ 3δEn ≥ 2Mn/3. Therefore, #Sn ≥ Mn/3, where Sn = {i|ǫBn (i) ≤ 3ǫBn and δEn (i) ≤ 3δEn }. We then
keep the message set Sn and throw out the rest to obtain Theorem 3.5. This causes the term ρ log 3n to intervene on the
right-hand side of (3.25).
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Remark 3.9 (Average vs. maximum criteria): Bound (3.35) is well known in channel coding (cf. Gal-
lager [11]), whereas bound (3.36) is taken into consideration for the first time in this paper.
In channel coding, which of the averaged ǫBn or the maximum m-ǫBn we should take would be rather
a matter of preference or the context. On the other hand, however, which of the averaged δEn or the
maximum m-δEn we should take is a serious matter from the viewpoint of secrecy. This is because,
even with small δEn , we cannot exclude a possibility that the divergence distance D(P
(i)
n ||πn) is very
large for some particular i ∈Mn, and hence m-δEn is also very large, which implies that the message
i is not saved from a serious risk of successful decryption by Eve. On the other hand, with small
m-δEn , every message i ∈Mn is guaranteed to be kept highly confidential against Eve as well. Thus,
we prefer the criterion m-δEn as well as m-ǫBn in this paper.
In view of Remark 3.7, we are tempted to go further over the properties of the functions Fc(q,RB , RE , n),
Hc(q,RE , n). In particular, we are interested in the behavior of the functions Fc(q,RB , RE ,+∞)
and Hc(q,RE ,+∞). In this connection, we have following lemma, where we let I(q,W ) denote the
mutual information between the input q and its output via the channel W .
Lemma 3.1: Assume that
∑
x∈X PX(x)c(x) ≤ Γ and I(q,W+B ) > 0, then
1) Fc(q,RB , RE ,+∞) = 0 at RB +RE = I(q,W+B );
2) Hc(q,RE ,+∞) = 0 at RE = I(q,W+E );
3) Fc(q,RB , RE ,+∞) is a monotone strictly decreasing positive convex function of RB+RE for
RB + RE < I(q,W
+
B ), and Fc(q,RB , RE ,+∞) = 0 for RB +RE ≥ I(q,W+B );
4) Hc(q,RE ,+∞) is a monotone strictly increasing positive convex function of RE for RE >
I(q,W+E ), and Hc(q,RE ,+∞) = 0 for RE ≤ I(q,W+E ).
Proof: See Appendix C. This lemma is used later to prove Theorems 3.7, 3.8.
C. Strengthening of Theorem 3.3
Let us now consider strengthening Theorem 3.3. Since it holds that∑
x∈X
PX(x)c(x) =
∑
v∈V
PV (v)c(v), (3.37)
where
c(v) =
∑
x∈X
c(x)PX|V (x|v), (3.38)
17
we see that E[c(X)] = E[c(V )], and hence
∑
x∈X PX(x)c(x) ≤ Γ is equivalent to
∑
v∈V PV (v)c(v) ≤
Γ. Therefore, it is concluded again by virtue of the central limit theorem that, as in the proof (Appendix
B) of Theorem 3.3, we have
lim
n→∞
µn = 1 with µn =
∑
v
χ(v)
n∏
i=1
PV (vi),
where v = (v1, v2, · · · , vn) ∈ Vn and, with any constant a such that 1/2 < a < 1
χ(v) =

 1 for
∑n
i=1 c(vi) ≤ nΓ + na,
0 otherwise,
(3.39)
so that T0 in the proof (Appendix B) of Theorem 3.3 can be replaced by T1 ≡ T0∩{v ∈ Vn|χ(v) = 1}
without affecting the process of the proof. This observation means that cost constraint Γ (with cost
c(x)) on PXn of the concatenated channel (Wn+B ,Wn+E ) is consistent with cost constraint Γ (with cost
c(v)) on PV n of the concatenated channel (Wn+B ,Wn+E ). Thus, by introducing the upper bound
χ(v) ≤ exp
[
s
(
nΓ−
n∑
i=1
c(vi) + n
a
)]
, (3.40)
where s ≥ 0 is an arbitrary number, we can strengthen upper bounds (3.21) and (3.22) as:
Theorem 3.6: With the same notation and assumption as in Theorem 3.3, we have
ǫBn
≤ 2e
s(1+ρ)na
α1+ρn βn
(MnLn)
ρ
·

∑
y∈Y

∑
v∈V
q(v)es[Γ−c(v)]
[∑
x∈X
WB(y|x)PX|V (x|v)e(1+ρ)r[Γ−c(x)]
] 1
1+ρ


1+ρ


n
,
(3.41)
δEn
≤ 2e
s(1−ρ)na
α1−ρn βn
1
ρLρn
·

∑
z∈Z

∑
v∈V
q(v)es[Γ−c(v)]
[∑
x∈X
WE(z|x)PX|V (x|v)e(1−ρ)r[Γ−c(x)]
] 1
1−ρ


1−ρ


n
.
(3.42)
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Remark 3.10: Notice here that the terms es(1+ρ)na and es(1−ρ)na in (3.41) and (3.42) do not affect
the exponents of exponential decay in n for ǫBn and δBn . Accordingly, instead of (3.25), (3.26) and
(3.27), (3.28), let us define
Fc(q,RB , RE , n)
≡ sup
s≥0,r≥0
sup
0≤ρ≤1
(
φ(ρ|WB , q, s, r) − ρ(RB + RE) + log(αnβ
1+ρ
n )− ρ log 3− sna
n
)
,
(3.43)
Hc(q,RE , n)
≡ sup
s≥0,r≥0
sup
0<ρ<1
(
φ(−ρ|WE , q, s, r) + ρRE + log(αnβ
1−ρ
n ) + log ρ− sna
n
)
,
(3.44)
φ(ρ|WB , q, s, r)
= − log

∑
y∈Y

∑
v∈V
q(v)es[Γ−c(v)]
[∑
x∈X
WB(y|x)PX|V (x|v)e(1+ρ)r[Γ−c(x)]
] 1
1+ρ


1+ρ

 ,
(3.45)
φ(−ρ|WE , q, s, r)
= − log

∑
z∈Z

∑
v∈V
q(v)es[Γ−c(v)]
[∑
x∈X
WE(z|x)PX|V (x|v)e(1−ρ)r[Γ−c(x)]
] 1
1−ρ


1−ρ

 .
(3.46)
Then, Theorems 3.4, 3.5 with the Fc(q,RB , RE , n), Hc(q,RE, n) thus modified are guaranteed to
give the performance better than or equal to the original version only with the term e(1+ρ)r[Γ−c(x)].
However, here we do not go into the details of its analysis. The case with r = 0 will be used later in
Section 7 to establish the reliability and secrecy functions for concatenated Poisson wiretap channels.
D. δ-secrecy capacity with cost constraint
Suppose that we are given a stationary memoryless wiretap channel (WB,WE), and consider any
Markov chain such that
V → X → Y Z, PY |X = WB , PZ|X = WE . (3.47)
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Then, we have
Theorem 3.7: Let (WB,WE) be a stationary memoryless wiretap channel with cost constraint Γ.
Then, the δ-secrecy capacity (cf. Section 2.C) is given by
δ-Cs(Γ) = sup
V X:E[c(X)]≤Γ
(I(V ;Y )− I(V ;Z)) (3.48)
under the maximum criterion (m-ǫBn ,m-δEn ), where the supremum on the right-hand side ranges over
all V X satisfying (3.47) and E[c(X)] ≤ Γ. ¶
Proof: It is not difficult to see that the converse part
δ-Cs(Γ) ≤ sup
V X:E[c(X)]≤Γ
(I(V ;Y )− I(V ;Z)) (3.49)
holds (cf. [9], [14]). Therefore, it suffices only to show the opposite inequality (achievability part).
To do so, let V0 → X0 → Y0Z0 denote the Markov chain to attain the supremum on the right-hand
side of (3.48) and let (W+B ,W+E ) indicate the concatenated wiretap channel of (WB,WE) using the
auxiliary channel PX0|V0 . Then, with q = PV0 it is easy to observe that I(V0;Y0) = I(q,W
+
B ) and
I(V0;Z0) = I(q,W
+
E ). Furthermore, with an arbitrarily small number τ > 0 we set as RB + RE =
I(q,W+B ) − τ and RE = I(q,W+E ) + τ , and hence RB = I(q,W+B ) − I(q,W+E ) − 2τ . With these
rates RB, RE Lemma 3.1 guarantees that
Fc(q,RB , RE ,+∞) > 0, Hc(q,RE,+∞) > 0,
which together with Theorem 3.5 concludes that both of the error probability ǫBn and the divergence
distance δEn exponentially decay with increasing n, provided that n is sufficiently large. Thus, the
rate RB = I(q,W+B ) − I(q,W+E )− 2τ is δ-achievable, that is, RB = I(V0;Y0) − I(V0;Z0) − 2τ is
δ-achievable under the maximum criterion (m-ǫBn ,m-δEn ) (cf. Theorem 3.5).
Now we are ready to go to the problem of the secrecy capacity when the wiretap channel (WB,WE)
is more capable:
Definition 3.1: Let (WB,WE) be a stationary memoryless wiretap channel. If I(X;Y ) ≥ I(X;Z)
holds for any input variable X , we say that the wiretap channel is more capable.
¶ After the submission of this paper, Hou and Kramer [8] independently obtained formula (3.48) for the case without cost
constraint (i.e., c(x) = Γ = 1 for all x ∈ X ) under the finite alphabet assumption; they call it the effective secrecy capacity.
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Theorem 3.8: If a stationary memoryless wiretap channel (WB,WE) with cost constraint Γ is more
capable, then the δ-secrecy capacity (cf. Section 2.C) is given by
δ-Cs(Γ) = sup
X:E[c(X)]≤Γ
(I(X;Y )− I(X;Z)) (3.50)
under the maximum criterion (m-ǫBn ,m-δEn ), where the supremum on the right-hand side ranges over
all X satisfying (3.47) and E[c(X)] ≤ Γ.
Proof: In the light of Theorem 3.7, it suffices to show that
I(V ;Y )− I(V ;Z) ≤ I(X;Y )− I(X;Z),
which is seen as follows.
I(V ;Y )− I(V ;Z) = I(V X;Y )− I(X;Y |V )− I(V X;Z) + I(X;Z|V )
= I(X;Y )− I(X;Z)− (I(X;Y |V )− I(X;Z|V ))
= I(X;Y )− I(X;Z)−
∑
v∈V
PV (v)(I(X;Y |V = v) − I(X;Z|V = v))
≤ I(X;Y )− I(X;Z), (3.51)
where in the last step we have used the more capability.
4. TRADEOFF OF RELIABILITY AND SECRECY
Thus far, we have established the general computable formulas for the reliability function Fc(q,RB , RE ,+∞)
and the secrecy function Hc(q,RE ,+∞) with the stationary memoryless wiretap channel under cost
constraint. From the viewpoint of secure communications, these should be regarded as a pair of
functions but not as separate ones, which then enables us to quantify the tradeoff of reliability and
secrecy. It should be emphasized that in wiretap channel coding it is one of the crucial problems
how to control tradeoff of reliability and secrecy. In order to elucidate this specifically, in this section
we focus on wiretap channels (WB,WE) consisting of two BSC’s (Binary Symmetric Channel) with
crossover probabilities εy for Bob and εz against Eve (0 ≤ εy < εz ≤ 1/2), because this class of
wiretap channels are quite tractable but still very informative.
On the basis of the paired functions, we can consider several ways to control the tradeoff of reliability
and secrecy. Typical four ways are considered and discussed in the following. A typical pair of
reliability and secrecy functions in this BSC case is depicted in Fig.2. It should be noted here that
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for any pair of BSC’s one is degraded (and hence also is more capable) with respect to the other
one, so that in calculating the δ-secrecy capacity δ-Cs(Γ) we can invoke formula (3.50) with q = PX
in Theorem 3.8 (along with Lemma 3.1). More specifically, let q indicate the input maximizing
I(q,WB)−I(q,WE) (while satisfying the condition
∑
x q(x)c(x) ≤ Γ), then this I(q,WB)−I(q,WE)
gives the δ-secrecy capacity δ-Cs(Γ), as is depicted in Fig.2. The input q in all the figures to follow
denotes the maximizing one in this sense.
A. Tradeoff of reliability and secrecy by rate shifting
First of all, Fig.2 immediately suggests a primitive and simple way (rate shifting) of the tradeoff:
moving RE (resolvability rate) while keeping RB (coding rate) unchanged enables us to control the
tradeoff between the reliability exponent and the secrecy exponent, i.e., increasing RE causes stronger
secrecy but with lower reliability, whereas decreasing RE causes higher reliability but with weaker
secrecy. A technological intuition is that increasing secrecy requires “expanding” each signaling point
into multiple, which is harmful from a reliability standpoint.
Fig. 2. Reliability and secrecy functions with cost constraint for non-concatenated BSC and rate shifting (εy = 0.1,
εz = 0.3, c(0) = 1, c(1) = 2, Γ = 1.4, q(1) = 0.4).
B. Tradeoff of reliability and secrecy by rate exchange
One more way to control such a tradeoff is to handle rates RB , RE , where the enhancement of
secrecy is attained at the expense of rate RB but not at the expense of reliability: with the same
exponents Fc(q,RB , RE ,+∞), Hc(q,RE ,+∞) as above, we let RE increase while keeping the
sum RB +RE unchanged, which implies decrease of rate RB but no expense of reliability, because
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then the value of Hc(q,RE ,+∞) increase but that of Fc(q,RB , RE ,+∞) remains unchanged. See
Fig.3. A technological meaning of this tradeoff is as follows: suppose that a codeword consists of
RB information bits, RE random bits and RH check bits in a memory device. The operation of rate
exchange corresponds to shifting of the partition between RB information bits and RE random bits,
while RB + RE is unchanged.
Fig. 3. Tradeoff by rate exchange: let RE → RE +∆ and RB → RB −∆ (RB +RE remains unchanged), then secrecy
against Eve increases by ∆ and rate RB decreases by ∆ but at no expense of reliability for Bob; εy = 0.1, εz = 0.3, c(0) =
1, c(2) = 2,Γ = 0.4, q(1) = 0.4
C. Tradeoff of reliability and secrecy by concatenation
Now, let us consider another BSC with crossover probability εv as an auxiliary channel PX|V : V → X
for concatenation. Then, the reliability and secrecy functions for both of the non-concatenated and
concatenated BSC wiretap channels can be depicted together in Fig.4. We observe from this figure
that, with fixed rates RB , RE , concatenation makes reliability for Bob decrease but makes secrecy
against Eve increase, which is guaranteed by Theorem 3.2. Especially, we can compute numerically this
tradeoff of reliability and secrecy in terms of their exponents Fc(q,RB , RE ,+∞) and Hc(q,RE,+∞).
Notice, from the technological point of view, the auxiliary channel can be simulated by using a random
number generator implemented by Alice. More importantly, the implementation of concatenation
(auxiliary channel) using a random number generator is technologically indispensable to achieve the
secrecy capacity when the channel is not more capable (or not less noisy). So, the concatenation
technique has two kind of technological advantages, one is to control the tradeoff and the other to
achieve the secrecy capacity.
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Fig. 4. Tradeoff by concatenation: reliability and secrecy functions for non-concatenated (solid lines) and concatenated
(dashed lines); εv = 0.025, εy = 0.1, εz = 0.3, c(0) = 1, c(1) = 2,Γ = 1.4, q(1) = 0.4 where reliability for Bob decreases
but secrecy against Eve increases with fixed RB, RE .
D. Tradeoff of reliability and secrecy by change of cost constraint
The fourth way to control the tradeoff between reliability and secrecy is to change cost constraint
Γ. Generally speaking, relaxing cost constraint Γ brings about increase of reliability and decrease of
secrecy, whereas strengthening cost constraint Γ brings about decrease of reliability and increase of
secrecy, as is shown in Figs. 5 and 6. This is because relaxing of cost constraint will increase the
ability of implementing, based on adaptive fitting of the input distribution q to the allowed cost Γ, good
codes with finer decoding regions at the fixed rate RB +RE , and hence leading to higher reliability
and at the same time leading to weaker secrecy at the fixed rate RE . Notice here that finer decoding
regions will decrease the ability of deceiving Eve; and vice versa. From the technological point of
view, this implies that cheaper cost can attain stronger secrecy but with lower reliability.
5. SECRECY CAPACITY OF POISSON WIRETAP CHANNEL
In this section, we consider application of Theorem 3.8 to the Poisson wiretap channel to determine
its secrecy capacity. First of all, let us define the Poisson wiretap channel (cf. [15], [16], [3]). The
input process to the Poisson channel is a waveform denoted by Xt (0 ≤ t ≤ T ) satisfying Xt ≥ 0
for all t, where T is an arbitrarily large time span. We assume that the input process is not only peak
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Fig. 5. Reliability function for non-concatenated BSC with varied cost constraint Γ. The reliability function curve moves
upward as allowed cost Γ becomes large (εy = 0.1, c(0) = 1, c(1) = 2).
Fig. 6. Secrecy function for non-concatenated BSC with varied cost constraint Γ. The secrecy function curve moves
downward as allowed cost Γ becomes large (εz = 0.3, c(0) = 1, c(1) = 2).
power limited, i.e., 0 ≤ Xt ≤ 1 for all t but also average power limited, i.e.,
1
T
∫ T
0
Xtdt ≤ Γ (0 ≤ Γ ≤ 1). (5.1)
The output signal to be received by the legitimate receiver Bob is a Poisson counting process Yt
(0 ≤ t ≤ T ) with instantaneous rate AyXt + λy (λy ≥ 0 is the dark current, and Ay > 0 specifies
attenuation of signal) such that
Yt=0 = 0, (5.2)
and, for 0 ≤ t, t+ τ ≤ T (τ > 0),
Pr{Yt+τ − Yt = j} = e
−ΛΛj
j!
(j = 0, 1, 2, · · ·), (5.3)
where
Λ =
∫ t+τ
t
(AyXu + λy)du. (5.4)
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Similarly, the output signal to be received by the eavesdropper Eve is a Poisson counting process Zt
(0 ≤ t ≤ T ) with instantaneous rate AzXt + λz .
We now want to discretize the continuous time process like this into a discrete time process in order
to make the problem more tractable with asymptotically negligible loss of performance. To do so, we
follow the way that Wyner [15] has demonstrated, and for the reader’s convenience we review here
his formulation to be exact. Let ∆ > 0 be an arbitrary very small constant. Then, we assume the
following.
a) The channel input Xt is constant for (i − 1)∆ < t ≤ i∆ (i = 1, 2, · · ·), and Xt takes only the
values 0 or 1. For i = 1, 2, · · ·, define as xi = 0 or 1 according as Xt = 0 or 1 in the interval
((i− 1)∆, i∆].
b) Bob observes only the samples Yi∆ (i = 1, 2, · · ·), and define as yi = 1 if Yi∆ − Y(i−1)∆ = 1;
yi = 0 otherwise. Here, Y0 = 0.
c) Eve observes only the samples Zi∆ (i = 1, 2, · · ·), and define as zi = 1 if Zi∆ − Z(i−1)∆ = 1;
zi = 0 otherwise. Here, Z0 = 0.
Owing to the discretization under assumptions a), b), c), we have two channels WB ,WE for Bob
and Eve, respectively, i.e., two-input two-output stationary memoryless discrete channels such as
WB : xi → yi and WE : xi → zi, whose transition probabilities are given, up to the order O(∆),
as
WB(1|0) = λy∆e−λy∆
≃ λy∆ = syAy∆, (5.5)
WB(1|1) = (Ay + λy)∆e−(Ay+λy)∆
≃ (Ay + λy)∆ = Ay(1 + sy)∆; (5.6)
WE(1|0) = λz∆e−λz∆
≃ λz∆ = szAz∆, (5.7)
WE(1|1) = (Az + λz)∆e−(Az+λz)∆
≃ (Az + λz)∆ = Az(1 + sz)∆, (5.8)
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where we have put
sy =
λy
Ay
, sz =
λz
Az
. (5.9)
Furthermore, a given fixed constant ∆ > 0 small enough, define the whole time interval T = n∆,
where n denotes the block length of the DMC. Then, the power constraint (5.1) is equivalent to
1
n
n∑
i=1
c(xi) ≤ Γ, (5.10)
where the additive cost c(x) is defined as c(x) = x for x = 0, 1. We are now almost ready to apply
Theorem 3.8 and Theorem 3.5 to find secrecy capacities and reliability/secrecy functions.
However, since Theorem 3.8 holds only for more capable channels, we need to impose some restriction
on the class of Poisson wiretap channels as above formulated. In this connection, we introduce the
concept of degradedness of channels as follows:
Definition 5.1 ([9]): A Poisson wiretap channel (WB,WE) is said to be (statistically) degraded ‖ if
there exists an auxiliary channel T : Y → Z such that
WE(z|x) =
∑
y∈Y
WB(y|x)T (z|y). (5.11)
In this connection, we have the following theorems:
Theorem 5.1 ([16], [3]): A Poisson wiretap channel is degraded if
Ay ≥ Az (5.12)
and
λy
Ay
≤ λz
Az
. (5.13)
Theorem 5.2 ([9]): A Poisson wiretap channel is more capable if it is degraded.
Thus, in the sequel, we confine ourselves to the class of Poisson wiretap channels satisfying (5.12)
and (5.13) to guarantee the application of Theorem 3.8, where we assume that at least one of them
holds with strict inequality; otherwise the problem is trivial.
‖More exactly, we should say that the channel WE is degraded with respect to the channel WB . Here, with abuse of
notation, we simply say that (WB,WE) is degraded.
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With these preparations, we now go to the problem of determining the secrecy capacity. Let X be a
channel input, and Y,Z be the channel output via WB ,WE , respectively, due to X . Following Wyner
[15] with q = Pr{X = 1}, we directly compute the mutual informations to have
I(X;Y ) = ∆Ay[−(q + sy) log(q + sy) + q(1 + sy) log(1 + sy)
+(1− q)sy log sy] ∆= f(q), (5.14)
I(X;Z) = ∆Az[−(q + sz) log(q + sz) + q(1 + sz) log(1 + sz)
+(1− q)sz log sz] ∆= g(q), (5.15)
σ(q)
∆
= f(q)− g(q). (5.16)
Then, it is evident that
σ(0) = σ(1) = 0. (5.17)
Moreover,
σ′′(q) = − ∆Ay
q + sy
+
∆Az
q + sz
< 0, (5.18)
where the inequality follows from (5.12) and (5.13). Therefore, σ(q) is strictly concave and takes the
maximum value at the unique q = q∗ in the interval (0, 1) with σ′(q∗) = 0. Thus, we have one of
the main results as follows.
Theorem 5.3: The δ-secrecy capacity with cost constraint δ-Cs(Γ) per second of the Poisson wiretap
channel (WB,WE) is given by
δ-Cs(Γ)
= log
(q∗Γ + sz)
(q∗Γ+sz)Az
(q∗Γ + sy)
(q∗Γ+sy)Ay
+ log
s
syAy
y
sszAzz
+q∗Γ
(
log
(q∗ + sy)
Ay
(q∗ + sz)Az
+ Ay −Az
)
(5.19)
under the maximum criterion (m-ǫBn , m-δEn ), where q = q∗ is the unique solution in (0, 1) of the
equation:
(Ayq
∗ + λy)
Ay
(Azq∗ + λz)Az
= eAz−Ay
(Ay + λy)
Ay+λy
(Az + λz)Az+λz
λλzz
λ
λy
y
, (5.20)
and
q∗Γ = min(q
∗,Γ). (5.21)
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Proof:: We develop σ(q) in (5.16) as follows:
σ(q) = ∆Ay[−(q + sy) log(q + sy)
+q(1 + sy) log(1 + sy) + (1− q)sy log sy]
+∆Az[(q + sz) log(q + sz)
−q(1 + sz) log(1 + sz)− (1− q)sz log sz]. (5.22)
Then, a direct computation shows that
σ′(q) = ∆Ay[− log(q + sy)− 1
+(1 + sy) log(1 + sy)− sy log sy]
+∆Az[log(q + sz) + 1
−(1 + sz) log(1 + sz) + sz log sz]
= ∆
[
(Az −Ay)− log (q + sy)
Ay
(q + sz)Az
+ log
(1 + sy)
(1+sy)Ay
(1 + sz)(1+sz)Az
− log s
syAy
y
sszAzz
]
. (5.23)
Hence, the solution q = q∗ of the equation σ′(q) = 0 is given by
log
(q∗ + sy)
Ay
(q∗ + sz)Az
= (Az − Ay) + log (1 + sy)
(1+sy)Ay
(1 + sz)(1+sz)Az
− log s
syAy
y
sszAzz
, (5.24)
which is equivalent to
(Ayq
∗ + λy)
Ay
(Azq∗ + λz)Az
= eAz−Ay
(Ay + λy)
Ay+λy
(Az + λz)Az+λz
λλzz
λ
λy
y
. (5.25)
On the other hand,
σ(q) = ∆ log
(q + sz)
(q+sz)Az
(q + sy)(q+sy)Ay
+∆q log
(1 + sy)
(1+sy)Ay
(1 + sz)(1+sz)Az
+∆(1− q) log s
syAy
y
sszAzz
= ∆ log
(q + sz)
(q+sz)Az
(q + sy)(q+sy)Ay
+∆ log
s
syAy
y
sszAzz
29
+∆q
(
log
(1 + sy)
(1+sy)Ay
(1 + sz)(1+sz)Az
− log s
syAy
y
sszAzz
)
= ∆ log
(q + sz)
(q+sz)Az
(q + sy)(q+sy)Ay
+∆ log
s
syAy
y
sszAzz
+∆q
(
log
(q∗ + sy)
Ay
(q∗ + sz)Az
+ Ay −Az
)
, (5.26)
where we used (5.24) in the last step. Consequently, with q∗Γ = min(q∗,Γ),
max
X:Ec(X)≤Γ
(I(X;Y )− I(X;Z))
= max
0≤q≤Γ
(I(X;Y )− I(X;Z))
= ∆ log
(q∗Γ + sz)
(q∗Γ+sz)Az
(q∗Γ + sy)
(q∗Γ+sy)Ay
+∆ log
s
syAy
y
sszAzz
+∆q∗Γ
(
log
(q∗ + sy)
Ay
(q∗ + sz)Az
+Ay −Az
)
. (5.27)
Since Theorem 3.8 claims that the left-hand side of (5.27) gives the δ-secrecy capacity per channel
use, it is concluded that the δ-secrecy capacity δ-Cs(Γ) per second is given by (5.19).
Example 5.1: It is easy to check that, in the special case without cost constraint (i.e., Γ = 1 and
hence q∗Γ = q∗), (5.19) boils down to
δ-Cs(1) = q
∗(Ay −Az) + log λ
λy
y
λλzz
+ log
(Azq
∗ + λz)
λz
(Ayq∗ + λy)λy
, (5.28)
which coincides with the average criterion formula for the w-Cs(1) as already developed in the
continuous time framework by Laourine and Wagner [3] with the same equation as (5.20). As for the
definition of w-Cs(Γ), see Section 2. From the security point of view, formula (5.28) is stronger than
the formula for w-Cs(1) as was discussed in Section 2.C, though δ-Cs(1) = w-Cs(1).
Example 5.2: Let us quote here the worst case scenario as demonstrated in [3] specified by
λy
Ay
=
λz
Az
= s.
In this case, it is shown in [3] that q∗ is given by
q∗ =
(1 + s)1+s
ess
− s. (5.29)
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It is then also easy to verify that (5.19) reduces to
δ-Cs(Γ) = (Ay −Az)

 −(qΓ + s) log(qΓ + s) + s log s
+qΓ [(1 + s) log(1 + s)− s log s]

 , (5.30)
where
qΓ = min
(
(1 + s)1+s
ess
− s,Γ
)
.
Moreover, in the particular case with s = 0 (no dark current), (5.30) reduces to
δ-Cs(Γ) = −(Ay − Az)qΓ log qΓ, (5.31)
where
qΓ = min
(
1
e
,Γ
)
.
6. RELIABILITY AND SECRECY FUNCTIONS OF POISSON WIRETAP CHANNEL
In this section, we consider application of Theorem 3.5 to the Poisson wiretap channel to evaluate
its reliability and secrecy functions. Here too, as in the previous section, we use the same two-input
two-output stationary memoryless channel model specified with the transition probabilities and the
cost constraint with parameters (5.5) ∼ (5.10). In this section we focus on Poisson wiretap channels
without concatenation (i.e., V ≡ X; cf. Remark 3.8), and later in Section 7 extend it to the case of
Poisson wiretap channels with concatenation. Also, we assume that the conditions for degradedness
(5.12) and (5.13) in Theorem 5.1 are satisfied.
A. Reliability function
The first concern in this section is on the behavior of the reliability function for Bob. Formula (3.35)
of Theorem 3.5 with q = PX is written as
m-ǫBn ≤ 6e−nFc(q,RB0,RE0,n)
= exp[−n sup
r≥0
sup
0≤ρ≤1
(EB0(ρ, q, r)− ρ(RB0 +RE0) +O(1/n))]
= exp[−n sup
r≥0
sup
0≤ρ≤1
(EB0(ρ, q, r)− ρ(RB0 +RE0)) + O(1)], (6.1)
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where we have set EB0(ρ, q, r) = φ(ρ|WB , q, r). Let us first evaluate EB0(ρ, q, r). Taking account
of (3.31), we have
EB0(ρ, q, r) = − log

∑
y∈Y
(∑
x∈X
q(x)WB(y|x)
1
1+ρ er[Γ−c(x)]
)1+ρ
= − log

 1∑
y=0
(
1∑
x=0
q(x)WB(y|x)
1
1+ρ er[Γ−c(x)]
)1+ρ
= − log
1∑
y=0
V 1+ρy − r(1 + ρ)Γ, (6.2)
where
Vy =
1∑
x=0
q(x)WB(y|x)
1
1+ρ e−rx (y = 0, 1).
(It should be noted here that in evaluation of (6.2) Wyner [15] used c(x) − Γ instead of Γ − c(x),
which causes some subtle irrelevance.) With q = q(1), an elementary caluculation using (5.5) and
(5.6) leads, up to the order O(∆), to
EB0(ρ, q, r) = −r(1 + ρ)Γ− (1 + ρ) log(1− q + qe−r)
+∆Ay
[
(1− q)sy + qe−r(1 + sy)
1− q + qe−r
]
−∆Ay

(1− q)s 11+ρy + qe−r(1 + sy) 11+ρ
1− q + qe−r


1+ρ
. (6.3)
First, in order to maximize EB0(ρ, q, r) with respect to r, set
g(r) = −r(1 + ρ)Γ− (1 + ρ) log(1− q + qe−r).
Then,
g′(r) = −(1 + ρ)Γ + (1 + ρ) qe
−r
1− q + qe−r ,
g′′(r) = −(1 + ρ) q
2e−r(1− q)
(1− q + qe−r)2 < 0,
which means that g(r) is strictly concave. It is evident that
g(0) = 0, g′(0) = −(1 + ρ)(Γ− q) ≤ 0,
where we have used that cost constraint Ec(X) ≤ Γ is written as q ≤ Γ. Consequently, we have
max
r≥0
g(r) = g(0) = 0, (6.4)
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and hence, up to the order O(∆),
EB0(ρ, q)
∆
= max
r≥0
EB0(ρ, q, r) = EB0(ρ, q, r = 0)
= ∆Ay
[
(1− q)sy + (1 + sy)q −
[
(1− q)s
1
1+ρ
y + q(1 + sy)
1
1+ρ
]1+ρ]
.
= ∆Ay
[
q + sy − sy(1 + τyq)1+ρ
]
, (6.5)
where
τy =
(
1 +
1
sy
) 1
1+ρ
− 1. (6.6)
On the other hand, (6.1) is rewritten as
m-ǫBn ≤ exp[−n sup
0≤ρ≤1
(EB0(ρ, q) − ρ(RB0 +RE0)) +O(1)]. (6.7)
Notice here that EB0(ρ, q)− ρ(RB0 +RE0) in (6.7) is the exponent per channel use, so that
EB0(ρ, q) − ρ(RB0 +RE0)
∆
gives the exponent per second. Therefore,
EB(ρ, q) =
EB0(ρ, q)
∆
, RB =
RB0
∆
, RE =
RE0
∆
gives the exponents per second. Thus, taking account of T = n∆, it turns out that (6.7) is equivalent
to
m-ǫBn ≤ exp[−T sup
0≤ρ≤1
(EB(ρ, q)− ρ(RB +RE)) + O(1)], (6.8)
where
EB(ρ, q) = Ay
[
q + sy − sy(1 + τyq)1+ρ
]
. (6.9)
We notice that formula (6.8) together with (6.9) coincides with that established by Wyner [1] for
non-wiretap Poisson channels, although the ways of derivation are different.
Since EB(ρ, q) is concave in ρ (cf. Gallager [11]), the supremum
sup
0≤ρ≤1
(EB(ρ, q)− ρ(RB +RE))
is specified by the equation:
dEB(ρ, q)
dρ
= RB +RE (0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1). (6.10)
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Carrying out a direct calculation of the left-hand side of (6.10), it follows that
RB + RE =
dEB(ρ, q)
dρ
= Aysy
[
q
(
1 +
1
sy
) 1
1+ρ (1 + τyq)
ρ
1 + ρ
log
(
1 +
1
sy
)
− (1 + τyq)1+ρ log(1 + τyq)
]
,
(6.11)
which together with (6.6) and (6.9) gives the parametric representation of the reliability function under
the maximum criterion m-ǫBn with parameter ρ.
Remark 6.1: The function
fB(R, q)
∆
= sup
0≤ρ≤1
(EB(ρ, q)− ρR) (R = RB +RE) (6.12)
can be derived by eliminating ρ from (6.9) using (6.11), and is zero at
RB + RE =
= Aysy
[
q
(
1 +
1
sy
)
log
(
1 +
1
sy
)
−
(
1 +
q
sy
)
log
(
1 +
q
sy
)]
∆
= hB(q) = I(q,WB)/∆, (6.13)
and fB(RB +RE , q) is convex and positive in the range: RB + RE < hB(q).
B. Secrecy function
Let us now turn to the problem of evaluating the secrecy function against Eve. We proceed in parallel
with the above case of reliability function. Formula (3.36) with q = PX of Theorem 3.5 is written
as
m-δEn ≤ 6e−nHc(q,RE0,n)
= exp[−n sup
0<ρ<1
sup
r≥0
(EE0(ρ, q, r) + ρRE0 +O(1/n))]
= exp[−n sup
0<ρ<1
sup
r≥0
(EE0(ρ, q, r) + ρRE0) + O(1)], (6.14)
where we have set EE0(ρ, q, r) = φ(−ρ|WE , q, r). Let us evaluate EE0(ρ, q, r). Taking account of
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(3.32), we have
EE0(ρ, q, r) = − log

∑
z∈Z
(∑
x∈X
q(x)WE(z|x)
1
1−ρ er[Γ−c(x)]
)1−ρ
= − log

 1∑
z=0
(
1∑
x=0
q(x)WE(z|x)
1
1−ρ er[Γ−c(x)]
)1−ρ
= − log
1∑
z=0
V 1−ρz − r(1− ρ)Γ, (6.15)
where
Vz =
1∑
x=0
q(x)WE(z|x)
1
1−ρ e−rx (z = 0, 1).
With q = q(1), an elementary caluculation using (5.7) and (5.8) leads, up to the order O(∆), to
EE0(ρ, q, r) = −r(1− ρ)Γ− (1− ρ) log(1− q + qe−r)
+∆Az
[
(1− q)sz + qe−r(1 + sz)
1− q + qe−r
]
−∆Az

(1− q)s 11−ρz + qe−r(1 + sz) 11−ρ
1− q + qe−r


1−ρ
. (6.16)
In order to first maximize EE0(ρ, q, r) with respect to r, set
h(r) = −r(1− ρ)Γ− (1− ρ) log(1− q + qe−r).
Then,
h′(r) = −(1− ρ)Γ + (1− ρ) qe
−r
1− q + qe−r ,
h′′(r) = −(1− ρ) q
2e−r(1− q)
(1− q + qe−r)2 < 0,
which means that h(r) is strictly concave. It is evident that
h(0) = 0, h′(0) = −(1− ρ)(Γ− q) ≤ 0.
Consequently, we have
max
r≥0
h(r) = h(0) = 0, (6.17)
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and hence, up to the order O(∆),
EE0(ρ, q)
∆
= max
r≥0
EE0(ρ, q, r) = EE0(ρ, q, r = 0)
= ∆Az
[
(1− q)sz + (1 + sz)q −
[
(1− q)s
1
1−ρ
z + q(1 + sz)
1
1−ρ
]1−ρ]
.
= ∆Az
[
q + sz − sz(1 + τzq)1−ρ
]
, (6.18)
where
τz =
(
1 +
1
sz
) 1
1−ρ
− 1. (6.19)
On the other hand, (6.14) is rewritten as
m-δEn ≤ exp[−n sup
0<ρ<1
(EE0(ρ, q) + ρRE0) +O(1)]. (6.20)
Notice here that EE0(ρ, q) + ρRE0 in (6.20) is the exponent per channel use, so that
EE0(ρ, q) + ρRE0
∆
gives the exponent per second. Therefore,
EE(ρ, q) =
EE0(ρ, q)
∆
, RE =
RE0
∆
gives the exponents per second. Thus, taking account of T = n∆, it turns out that (6.20) is equivalent
to
m-δEn ≤ exp[−T sup
0<ρ<1
(EE(ρ, q) + ρRE) + O(1)], (6.21)
where
EE(ρ, q) = Az
[
q + sz − sz(1 + τzq)1−ρ
]
. (6.22)
Since EE(ρ, q) is concave in ρ, the supremum
sup
0<ρ<1
(EE(ρ, q) + ρRE)
is specified by the equation;
− dEE(ρ, q)
dρ
= RE (0 < ρ < 1). (6.23)
Carrying out a direct calculation of the left-hand side of (6.23), it follows that
RE = −dEE(ρ, q)
dρ
= Azsz
[
q
(
1 +
1
sz
) 1
1−ρ (1 + τzq)
−ρ
1− ρ log
(
1 +
1
sz
)
− (1 + τzq)1−ρ log(1 + τzq)
]
,
(6.24)
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which together with (6.19) and (6.22) gives the parametric representation of the secrecy function under
the maximum criterion m-δEn with parameter ρ.
Remark 6.2: The function
fE(R, q)
∆
= sup
0<ρ<1
(EE(ρ, q) + ρR) (R = RE) (6.25)
can be derived by eliminating ρ from (6.22) using (6.24), and is zero at
RE = Azsz
[
q
(
1 +
1
sz
)
log
(
1 +
1
sz
)
−
(
1 +
q
sz
)
log
(
1 +
q
sz
)]
∆
= hE(q) = I(q,WE)/∆, (6.26)
and fE(RE, q) is convex and positive in the range: RE > hE(q). It should be noted here that the form
of the function fE(R, q) is the same as that of fB(R, q) in (6.12) of Remark 6.1, while they are positive
in the opposite directions, i.e., (6.26) and RE > hE(q) correspond to (6.13) and RB +RE < hB(q),
respectively.
Fig. 7. Reliability and secrecy functions for Poisson channel (Ay = 12, λy = 0.5, Az = 5, λz = 1.5, Γ = 0.5,
q(1) = 0.38).
Remark 6.3: As was stated in the previous section, degradedness implies more capability, so that
it holds in the non-degenerated case that I(q;WB) > I(q;WE) for some q owing to the assumed
degradedness, which guarantees that the secrecy function curve crosses the reliability function curve.
This property enables us to control the tradeoff between reliability and secrecy (cf. Section 4.). It
should be noted here that in the above arguments the common input probability q is shared by both
the reliability function and the secrecy function. This implies that maximization over q should not
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be taken separately for the reliability function and the secrecy function, but should be taken for
I(q;WB)− I(q;WE) to achieve the δ-secrecy capacity δ-Cs(Γ) of the wiretap channel, as long as q
satisfies the cost constraint q ≤ Γ. A typical case is illustrated in Fig.7.
7. CONCATENATION FOR POISSON WIRETAP CHANNEL
In this section, we investigate the effects of concatenation for performance of Poisson wiretap channels.
We first observe a basic property (invariance) of Poisson wiretap channel under concatenation (on
the basis of Theorem 3.5 and Theorem 3.8). Here too, we use the notation as used in Sections 5, 6.
Theorem 7.1: If a Poisson wiretap channel is degraded, i.e., (5.12) and (5.13) are satisfied, then its
concatenated Poisson wiretap channel also satisfies the same form of conditions as (5.12) and (5.13).
Proof: Set the transition probabilities PX|V of the auxiliary binary channel as
a = PX|V (1|1), 1− a = PX|V (0|1); (7.1)
b = PX|V (1|0), 1− b = PX|V (0|0), (7.2)
where we assume that 1 ≥ a > b ≥ 0. Then, the transition probabilities of the concatenated channel
(W+B ,W
+
E ) are given by
W+B (1|1) = [a(Ay + λy) + (1− a)λy]∆ = [aAy + λy]∆, (7.3)
W+B (1|0) = [b(Ay + λy) + (1− b)λy]∆ = [bAy + λy]∆; (7.4)
W+E (1|1) = [a(Az + λz) + (1− a)λz]∆ = [aAz + λz]∆, (7.5)
W+E (1|0) = [b(Az + λz) + (1− b)λz]∆ = [bAz + λz]∆. (7.6)
Notice that the concatenated channel is also a Poisson wiretap channel, and let the peak power and
dark currents of the concatenated channel be denoted by A+y , A+z , λ+y , λ+z , respectively, then we
obtain
λ+y = W
+
B (1|0)/∆ = bAy + λy, (7.7)
A+y = (W
+
B (1|1)−W+B (1|0))/∆ = (a− b)Ay, (7.8)
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λ+z = W
+
E (1|0)/∆ = bAz + λz, (7.9)
A+z = (W
+
E (1|1)−W+E (1|0))/∆ = (a− b)Az, (7.10)
which means that concatenation has the effect of not only attenuating peak powers to a factor of a− b
but also augmenting a factor of b to dark currents. Recall that we have set as
sy =
λy
Ay
, sz =
λz
Az
. (7.11)
According to (7.11), set
s+y =
λ+y
A+y
, s+z =
λ+z
A+z
, (7.12)
then
s+y =
bAy + λy
(a− b)Ay =
b+ sy
a− b , (7.13)
s+z =
bAz + λy
(a− b)Az =
b+ sz
a− b . (7.14)
from which it follows that
sy ≤ sz ⇐⇒ s+y ≤ s+z . (7.15)
Moreover, from (7.8) and (7.10) it follows that
Ay ≥ Az ⇐⇒ A+y ≥ A+z , (7.16)
which completes the proof.
Since we are considering the case where the non-concatenated channel (WB,WE) satisfies conditions
(5.12) and (5.13), Theorem 7.1 ensures that the concatenated channel (W+B ,W+E ) also satisfies these
conditions as well. Therefore, in view of Theorem 5.1 and Theorem 5.2, (W+B ,W
+
E ) is more capable,
so that we can use the same arguments as were developed in Section 5. On the other hand, p =
Pr{X = 1} is given as
p = qa+ (1− q)b (7.17)
with q = Pr{V = 1}. Therefore, solving (7.17) with respect to q, we see that the problem with
cost constraint p ≤ Γ (c(x) = x) on PX is equivalent to cost constraint Γ+ (c(v) = v) on PV such
that
q ≤ Γ− b
a− b
∆
= Γ+, (7.18)
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where Γ ≥ b is assumed (cf. Section 3.C with c(1) = a, c(0) = b). Thus, based on (7.15) ∼ (7.18),
we can develop the same arguments on secrecy capacity as well as reliability/secrecy functions as in
Sections 5 and 6, which will be briefly summarized in the sequel.
A. Secrecy capacity
The following theorem is the concatenation counterpart of Theorem 5.3 without concatenation.
Theorem 7.2: Let a > b and Γ ≥ b. Then, the δ-secrecy capacity with cost constraint δ-C+s (Γ) per
second of the concatenated Poisson wiretap channel (W+B ,W
+
E ) is given by
δ-C+s (Γ)
= log
(q∗Γ + s
+
z )
(q∗Γ+s
+
z )A
+
z
(q∗Γ + s
+
y )(q
∗
Γ+s
+
y )A
+
y
+ log
(s+y )
s+y A
+
y
(s+z )s
+
z A
+
z
+q∗Γ
(
log
(q∗ + s+y )
A+y
(q∗ + s+z )A
+
z
+A+y − A+z
)
(7.19)
under the maximum criterion (m-ǫBn , m-δEn ), where q = q∗ is the unique solution in (0, 1) of the
equation:
(A+y q
∗ + λ+y )
A+y
(A+z q∗ + λ
+
z )A
+
z
= eA
+
z −A
+
y
(A+y + λ
+
y )
A+y+λ
+
y
(A+z + λ
+
z )A
+
z +λ
+
z
(λ+z )
λ+z
(λ+y )λ
+
y
, (7.20)
and
q∗Γ = min(q
∗,Γ+). (7.21)
Proof: It is not difficult to check that 0 < q∗ < 1 as was shown in Section 5. Then, it suffices to
proceed in parallel with the proof of Theorem 5.3.
Example 7.1: It is easy to check that, in the special case without cost constraint (i.e., Γ = a and
hence q∗Γ = q∗), (7.19) reduces to
δ-C+s (a) = q
∗(A+y −A+z ) + log
(λ+y )
λ+y
(λ+z )λ
+
z
+ log
(A+z q
∗ + λ+z )
λ+z
(A+y q∗ + λ
+
y )λ
+
y
(7.22)
with equation (7.20).
B. Reliability function
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Theorem 7.3: The maximum error probability m-ǫBn for (W+B ,W
+
E ) is upper bounded (with 0 ≤ q ≤
Γ+) as
m-ǫBn ≤ exp[−T sup
0≤ρ≤1
(
E+B (ρ, q)− ρ(RB + RE)
)
+O(1)], (7.23)
where
E+B (ρ, q) = A
+
y
[
q + s+y − s+y (1 + τ+y q)1+ρ
]
, (7.24)
τ+y =
(
1 +
1
s+y
) 1
1+ρ
− 1. (7.25)
Furthermore, the ρ to attain the supremum in (7.23) is specified by
RB +RE =
dE+B (ρ, q)
dρ
= A+y s
+
y
[
q
(
1 +
1
s+y
) 1
1+ρ (1 + τ+y q)
ρ
1 + ρ
log
(
1 +
1
s+y
)
−(1 + τ+y q)1+ρ log(1 + τ+y q)
]
, (7.26)
which together with (7.24) and (7.25) gives the parametric representation of the reliability function
with parameter ρ.
Proof: Since the concatenated channel (W+B ,W+E ) also satisfies conditions (5.12) and (5.13) with
superscript “+,” it suffices to replace Ay, λy , τy , EB(ρ, q) in (6.6), (6.9) and (6.11) by A+y , λ+y , τ+y ,
E+B (ρ, q), respectively. This proof is actually equivalent to the case with r = 0 in (3.41) in Theorem
3.6.
C. Secrecy function
Theorem 7.4: The maximum divergence m-δEn for (W+B ,W
+
E ) is upper bounded (with 0 ≤ q ≤ Γ+)
as
m-δEn ≤ exp[−T sup
0<ρ<1
(
E+E (ρ, q) + ρRE
)
+O(1)], (7.27)
where
E+E (ρ, q) = A
+
z
[
q + s+z − s+z (1 + τ+z q)1−ρ
]
, (7.28)
τ+z =
(
1 +
1
s+z
) 1
1−ρ
− 1. (7.29)
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Furthermore, the ρ to attain the supremum in (7.27) is specified by
RE = −dE
+
E (ρ, q)
dρ
= A+z s
+
z
[
q
(
1 +
1
s+z
) 1
1−ρ (1 + τ+z q)
−ρ
1− ρ log
(
1 +
1
s+z
)
−(1 + τ+z q)1−ρ log(1 + τ+z q)
]
, (7.30)
which together with (7.28) and (7.29) gives the parametric representation of the secrecy function with
parameter ρ.
Proof: Since the concatenated channel (W+B ,W+E ) also satisfies conditions (5.12) and (5.13) with
superscript “+,” it suffices to replace Az, λz , τz , EE(ρ, q) in (6.19), (6.22) and (6.24) by A+z , λ+z , τ+z ,
E+E (ρ, q), respectively. This proof is actually equivalent to the case with r = 0 in (3.42) in Theorem
3.6.
Typical forms of reliability and secrecy functions of Poisson wiretap channel with and without
concatenation are depicted together in Fig.8.
Fig. 8. Comparison of reliability and secrecy function for non-concatenated (solid line) and concatenated (dash line, a=0.98,
b = 0.02) Poisson channel (Ay = 12, λy = 0.5, Az = 5, λz = 1.5, Γ = 0.5, q(1) = 0.38).
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8. SECRECY CAPACITY OF GAUSSIAN WIRETAP CHANNEL
In this section, we first consider application of Theorem 3.8 to the discrete time stationary memoryless
Gaussian wiretap channel to determine the δ-secrecy capacity. Let the Gaussian wiretap channel be
denoted by (WB,WE) and the input by X , and let Y,Z be the outputs via channels WB ,WE ,
respectively, due to the input X , i.e.,
Y = AyX +Ny, (8.1)
Z = AzX +Nz, (8.2)
where Ay > 0, Az > 0 are positive constants specifying attenuation of signal, and Ny,Nz are Gaussian
additive noises with variances σ2y, σ2z , respectively. Here, we have an analogue of Theorem 5.1:
Theorem 8.1: A Gaussian wiretap channel is (statistically) degraded if
σy
Ay
≤ σz
Az
. (8.3)
Proof: Set
σ˜2 =
A2y
A2z
σ2z − σ2y,
where σ˜ ≥ 0 follows from (8.3). Then, there exists a fictitious Gaussian noise N˜ with variance σ˜2
that is independent from Ny such that
AyX +Ny + N˜ ≃ AyX + Ay
Az
Nz =
Ay
Az
(AzX +Nz),
where “U ≃ V ” means that U and V are subject to the same statistics. In view of (8.3), this means
that AzX + Nz can be obtained by adding the fictitious noise N˜ and attenuating AyX + Ny + N˜ .
Hereafter, we assume that condition (8.3) is satisfied. Since degradedness implies more capability
(cf. Theorem 5.2), we can invoke Theorem 3.8 with cost function c(x) = x2 and cost constraint
E[c(X)] ≤ Γ to have
Theorem 8.2: The δ-secrecy capacity δ-Cs(Γ) of a Gaussian wiretap channel under cost constraint Γ
is given by
δ-Cs(Γ) =
1
2
log
(
1 +
A2yΓ
σ2y
)
− 1
2
log
(
1 +
A2zΓ
σ2z
)
, (8.4)
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under the maximum criterion (m-ǫBn , m-δEn ).
Example 8.1: A weak secrecy version of formula (8.4) with Ay = Az = 1 is found earlier in Cheong
and Hellman [17]: under the average criterion,
w-Cs(Γ) =
1
2
log
(
1 +
Γ
σ2y
)
− 1
2
log
(
1 +
Γ
σ2z
)
. (8.5)
Proof of Theorem 8.2:
Define the differential entropy for probability density function f(u) by
h(f) = −
∫
f(u) log f(u)du.
Then,
I(X;Y )− I(X;Z)
= h(Y )− h(Z)− h(Y |X) + h(Z|X)
= h(Y )− h(Z)− h(Ny) + h(Nz)
= h(Y )− h(Z)− 1
2
log σ2y +
1
2
log σ2z
= h
(
Y
Ay
)
− h
(
Z
Az
)
+ log(Ay/Az)− 1
2
log σ2y +
1
2
log σ2z . (8.6)
We now observe the following equivalence:
max
X:Ec(X)≤Γ
(I(X;Y )− I(X : Z)) ⇐⇒ max
X:Ec(X)≤Γ
(
h
(
Y
Ay
)
− h
(
Z
Az
))
. (8.7)
On the other hand, Liu and Viswanath [18] guarantees that the maximization on the right-hand side
is attained by a Gaussian density PX with variance σ2 ≤ Γ. It is then easy to check that
g(Γ)
∆
= max
X:Ec(X)≤Γ
(
h
(
Y
Ay
)
− h
(
Z
Az
))
=
1
2
max
σ2≤Γ
[
log
(
σ2 +
σ2y
A2y
)
− log
(
σ2 +
σ2z
A2z
)]
=
1
2
log
(
Γ +
σ2y
A2y
)
− 1
2
log
(
Γ +
σ2z
A2z
)
, (8.8)
where in the last step we have used (8.3). Susbtituting (8.8) into (8.6) and rearranging it, we eventually
obtain
max
X:Ec(X)≤Γ
(I(X;Y )− I(X : Z)) = 1
2
log
(
1 +
A2yΓ
σ2y
)
− 1
2
log
(
1 +
A2zΓ
σ2z
)
, (8.9)
which together with Theorem 3.8 concludes Theorem 8.2.
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9. RELIABILITY AND SECRECY FUNCTIONS OF GAUSSIAN WIRETAP CHANNEL
In this section, we consider application of Theorem 3.5 to the Gaussian wiretap channel to evaluate
its reliability and secrecy functions. To this end, it is convenient here to use, according to (3.35) and
(3.36), formulas
m-ǫBn ≤ exp[−n sup
s≥0
sup
0≤ρ≤1
(EB(ρ, q, s)− ρ(RB + RE)) +O(1)] , (9.1)
m-δEn ≤ exp[−n sup
s≥0
sup
0<ρ<1
(EE(ρ, q, s) + ρRE) +O(1)], (9.2)
where
EB(ρ, q, s) = − log
[∫
y
(∫
x
q(x)WB(y|x)
1
1+ρ es[Γ−c(x)]dx
)1+ρ
dy
]
, (9.3)
EE(ρ, q, s) = − log
[∫
z
(∫
x
q(x)WE(z|x)
1
1−ρ es[Γ−c(x)]dx
)1−ρ
dz
]
. (9.4)
Remark 9.1: These formulas (9.1) ∼ (9.4) are the continuous alphabet non-concatenated versions of
(3.35) and (3.36) in Theorem 3.5 (cf. Remark 3.8).
A. Reliability function
We first insert the transition probability density of the Gaussian channel WB :
WB(y|x) = 1√
2πσ2B
exp
[
−(y −Ayx)
2
2σ2B
]
(9.5)
and the input distributen for X:
q(x) =
1√
2πΓ
exp
[
−x
2
2Γ
]
(9.6)
into (9.3) to have
EB(ρ, q, s)
= −s(1 + ρ)A2yΓ +
1
2
log(1 + 2sA2yΓ) +
ρ
2
log
[
1 + 2sA2yΓ +
A2yΓ
(1 + ρ)σ2B
]
,
(9.7)
where s ≥ 0 is an arbitrary constant. Set
AB =
A2yΓ
σ2B
, (9.8)
βB = 1 + 2sA
2
yΓ +
AB
(1 + ρ)
, (9.9)
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where βB ranges as
1 +
AB
1 + ρ
≤ βB < +∞. (9.10)
Use (9.8) and (9.9) to eliminate Γ, σ2B and s from (9.7), and consider EB(ρ, q, s) as a function
EB(AB , βB, ρ) of AB, βB , ρ, then
EB(AB, βB , ρ)
=
1
2
[
(1− βB)(1 + ρ) + AB + log
(
βB − AB
1 + ρ
)
+ ρ log βB
]
. (9.11)
Hence,
dEB
dβB
=
1
2
[
−(1 + ρ) + 1 + ρ
βB(1 + ρ)−AB +
ρ
βB
]
. (9.12)
Notice that the right-hand side of (9.12) is decreasing in βB because βB(1+ ρ)−AB > 1+ ρ owing
to (9.10) and that
dEB
dβB
< 0 at βB = 1 +
AB
1 + ρ
and dEB
dβB
< 0 when βB → +∞.
Therefore, EB has the maximum value at βB = 1 + AB1+ρ , i.e.,
EB(ρ)
∆
= max
βB≥1+
AB
1+ρ
EB(AB, βB , ρ) =
ρ
2
log
(
1 +
AB
1 + ρ
)
(0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1). (9.13)
On the other hand, EB(ρ)− ρ(RB +RE) has a stationary point with respect to ρ, i.e.,
∂(EB(ρ)− ρ(RB +RE))
∂ρ
=
1
2
log
(
1 +
AB
1 + ρ
)
− ρAB
2(1 + ρ)(1 + ρ+AB)
− (RB + RE) = 0.
(9.14)
Hence,
RB +RE =
1
2
log
(
1 +
AB
1 + ρ
)
− ρAB
2(1 + ρ)(1 + ρ+AB)
. (9.15)
As a consequence, by means of (9.13) and (9.15), we obtain
EB(RB, RE)
∆
= EB(ρ)− ρ(RB +RE)
=
ρ2AB
2(1 + ρ)(1 + ρ+AB)
. (9.16)
Thus, we have
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Theorem 9.1 (Reliability function): The reliability function EB(RB, RE) of a Gaussian wiretap chan-
nel under the maximum criterion m-ǫBn is given by the following parametric representation with
0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1:
EB(RB, RE) =
ρ2AB
2(1 + ρ)(1 + ρ+ AB)
, (9.17)
RB +RE =
1
2
log
(
1 +
AB
1 + ρ
)
− ρAB
2(1 + ρ)(1 + ρ+ AB)
(9.18)
for RH,c ≤ RB +RE ≤ 12 log (1 +AB) with
RH,c ≡ 1
2
log
(
1 +
AB
2
)
− AB
4(2 +AB)
, (9.19)
whereas, for 0 ≤ RB +RE ≤ RH,c,
EB(RB, RE) =
1
2
log
(
1 +
AB
2
)
− (RB + RE). (9.20)
So far we have established the formula for reliability function based on upper bound (B.8). In contrast
with Theorem 9.1, Gallager [11] has derived another reliability function based on upper bound (3.24),
leading to the exponent formula
EB(ρ, q, s) = − log
[∫
y
(∫
x
q(x)WB(y|x)
1
1+ρ es[c(x−Γ)]dx
)1+ρ
dy
]
(9.21)
instead of (9.3). It should be noted here that in (9.21) c(x) − Γ appears instead of Γ − c(x). Then,
we have
Theorem 9.2 (Reliability function: Gallager): The reliability function of a Gaussian wiretap channel
under the maximum criterion m-ǫBn is given by
EB(RB, RE)
=
AB
4βB
[
(βB + 1)− (βB − 1)
√
1 +
4βB
AB(βB − 1)
]
+
1
2
log
[
βB − AB(βB − 1)
2
(√
1 +
4βB
AB(βB − 1) − 1
)]
(9.22)
with βB = e2(RB+RE). Formula (9.22) is valid in the range of R = RB +RE as follows:
RG,c ≡ 1
2
log
[
1
2
+
AB
4
+
1
2
√
1 +
A2B
4
]
≤ R ≤ 1
2
log(1 + AB). (9.23)
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For R less than the left-hand side of (9.23), we must choose ρ = 1 yielding
EB(RB, RE) = 1− βB + AB
2
+
1
2
log
(
βB − AB
2
)
+
1
2
log βB − (RB +RE), (9.24)
where
βB =
1
2
[
1 +
AB
2
+
√
1 +
A2B
4
]
.
Fig. 9. Comparison of reliability function for Gaussian channel derived in thist paper (solid line) and derived by Gallager
(dashed line) (Ay = 1, σy = 0.5, Γ = 0.5).
Two reliability functions derived in the above are depicted in Fig.9. Also, two critical rates RH,c, RG,c
defined in (9.19) and (9.23) have the following relation:
Lemma 9.1 (Critical rates):
RH,c ≤ RG,c for all AB . (9.25)
Proof: Set g(AB) = RG,c −RH,c. Then,
g′(AB) =
(4 + 2AB)
√
1 +
A2B
4 + (4AB + 7A
2
B +A
3
B − 4)
2(2 + AB)2
(
(4 + 2AB)
√
1 +
A2B
4 + (4 +A
2
B)
) ≥ 0
holds for all AB , which together with g(0) = 0 yields (9.25).
B. Secrecy function
In this subsection, we evaluate the right-hand side of (9.2) on the secrecy function. The arguments
here proceed in parallel with those in the previous subsection with due modifications and −ρ instead
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of ρ. Here too, we insert the transition probability density of the Gaussian channel WE:
WE(z|x) = 1√
2πσ2E
exp
[
−(z − Azx)
2
2σ2E
]
(9.26)
and the input disturbution for X:
q(x) =
1√
2πΓ
exp
[
−x
2
2Γ
]
(9.27)
into (9.4) to have
EE(ρ, q, s)
= −s(1− ρ)A2zΓ +
1
2
log(1 + 2sA2zΓ)−
ρ
2
log
[
1 + 2sA2zΓ +
A2zΓ
(1− ρ)σ2E
]
,
(9.28)
where s ≥ 0 is an arbitrary constant. Here we set
AE =
A2zΓ
σ2E
, (9.29)
βE = 1 + 2sA
2
zΓ +
AE
1− ρ, (9.30)
then βE ranges as
1 +
AE
1− ρ ≤ βE < +∞. (9.31)
Use (9.29) and (9.30) to eliminate Γ, σ2E and s from (9.28), and consider EE(ρ, q, s) as a function
EB(AE, βE , ρ) of AB , βE , ρ, then
EE(AE, βE , ρ)
=
1
2
[
(1− βE)(1− ρ) + AE + log
(
βE − AE
1− ρ
)
− ρ log βE
]
. (9.32)
A stationary point with respect to βE (and hence also with respect to s) is specified by
dEE
dβE
=
1
2
[
−(1− ρ) + 1− ρ
βE(1− ρ)−AE −
ρ
βE
]
= 0. (9.33)
Notice that the right-hand side of (9.33) is decreasing in βE because βE(1− ρ)−AE ≥ 1− ρ owing
to (9.31) and that
dEE
dβE
> 0 at βE = 1 +
AE
1− ρ and
dEE
dβE
< 0 when βE → +∞.
Therefore, equation (9.33) has the unique solution for βE , i.e.,
βE =
1
2
(
1 +
AE
1− ρ
)[
1 +
√
1 +
4AEρ
(1− ρ+AE)2
]
. (9.34)
49
On the other hand, EE + ρRE has a stationary point with respect to ρ, i.e.,
∂(EE + ρRE)
∂ρ
= −1
2
[
1− βE + βE
βE(1− ρ)−AE −
1
1− ρ + log βE
]
+RE = 0.
(9.35)
From (9.33) and (9.35), it follows that
RE =
1
2
log βE. (9.36)
Furthermore, combining (9.32) with (9.36), we obtain
EE(RE)
∆
= EE + ρRE
=
1
2
[
(1− βE)(1− ρ) +AE + log
(
βE − AE
1− ρ
)]
. (9.37)
On the other hand, equation (9.33) can be solved for ρ as follows:
1− ρ = AE
2βE
[
1 +
√
1 +
4βE
AE(βE − 1)
]
, (9.38)
which inserted into (9.37) yields the following theorem:
Theorem 9.3 (Secrecy function): The secrecy function of a Gaussian wiretap channel under the max-
imum criterion m-δEn is given by
EE(RE)
=
AE
4βE
[
(βE + 1)− (βE − 1)
√
1 +
4βE
AE(βE − 1)
]
+
1
2
log
[
βE − AE(βE − 1)
2
(√
1 +
4βE
AE(βE − 1) − 1
)]
(9.39)
with βE = e2RE .
Remark 9.2: It should be noted that the form of the function in (9.22) is the same as that in (9.39),
but the ranges where they are valid are opposite, i.e., formula (9.39) is valid in the range of RE :
RE ≥ 1
2
log(1 +AE), (9.40)
where parameter ρ = 0 corresponds to RE = 12 log(1 + AE) and ρ→ 1 corresponds to RE → +∞,
whereas (9.22) along with (9.24) is valid when RB +RE ≤ 12 log(1 +AB).
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Now in view of Theorem 9.2, one may be tempted to derive the secrecy function based on upper
bound (3.24), leading to the exponent formula
EE(ρ, q, s) = − log
[∫
z
(∫
x
q(x)WE(z|x)
1
1−ρ es[c(x)−Γ]dx
)1−ρ
dz
]
(9.41)
instead of (9.4). It should be noted here that in (9.41) c(x)− Γ appears instead of Γ− c(x). Let us
see what happens in this case. It is first straightforward to check that (9.41) is developed as
EE(ρ, q, s)
= s(1− ρ)A2zΓ +
1
2
log(1− 2sA2zΓ)−
ρ
2
log
[
1− 2sA2zΓ +
A2zΓ
(1− ρ)σ2E
]
(9.42)
with
AE =
A2zΓ
σ2E
, (9.43)
βE = 1− 2sA2zΓ +
AE
1− ρ, (9.44)
where it is evident that βE ranges as
AE
1− ρ < βE ≤ 1 +
AE
1− ρ.
As was shown in the proof of Theorem 9.1, (9.41) is rewritten as a function of AE , βE, ρ as
follows:
EE(AE, βE , ρ)
=
1
2
[
(1− βE)(1− ρ) + AE + log
(
βE − AE
1− ρ
)
− ρ log βE
]
. (9.45)
Then, it is not difficult to verify that
EE(ρ)
∆
= max
AE
1−ρ
<βE≤1+
AE
1−ρ
EE(AE, βE , ρ)
= EE(AE, 1 +
AE
1− ρ, ρ)
= −ρ
2
log
(
1 +
AE
1− ρ
)
. (9.46)
Moreover, the equation
∂(EE(ρ) + ρRE)
∂ρ
= 0
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yields
RE =
1
2
log
(
1 +
AE
1− ρ
)
+
ρAE
2(1− ρ)(1− ρ+AE) . (9.47)
Then, from (9.46) and (9.47) it follows that
EE(RE)
∆
= EE(ρ) + ρRE =
ρ2AE
2(1− ρ)(1− ρ+AE) . (9.48)
Thus, we have
Theorem 9.4 (Secrecy function: Gallager-type): The secrecy function EB(RB, RE) of a Gaussian
wiretap channel under the maximum criterion m-δEn is given by the following parametric representation
with 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1:
EE(RE) =
ρ2AE
2(1− ρ)(1− ρ+ AE) , (9.49)
RE =
1
2
log
(
1 +
AE
1− ρ
)
+
ρAE
2(1− ρ)(1− ρ+AE) (9.50)
for RE ≥ 12 log(1 +AE).
Two secrecy functions derived in the above are depicted in Fig.10.
Fig. 10. Comparison of secrecy function for Gaussian channel with formula derived in this paper (solid line) and Gallager-
type formula (dashed line) (Az = 0.5, σz = 0.8, Γ = 0.5).
Remark 9.3: In Fig.11 we see that as for the reliability function Gallager bound outperforms our
bound, whereas as for the secrecy function our bound outperforms Gallager-type bound. It is interesting
to observe a kind of dualities holding among Theorem 9.1 ∼ Theorem 9.4, which is illustrated in Fig.
12.
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Fig. 11. Reliability and secrecy functions: comparison of Gallager-type formula (dashed line) and our forumla (solid line)
for Gaussian channel (Ay = 1, σy = 0.5, Az = 0.5, σz = 0.8, Γ = 0.5.).
Fig. 12. The reliability function in Theorem 9.1 (this paper) has the same form as that of the secrecy function in Theorem
9.4 (this paper: Gallager-type), whereas the secrecy function in Thoerm 9.3 (this paper) has the same form as that of the
reliability function in Theorem 9.2 (Gallager).
10. CONCLUDING REMARKS
So far we have established the δ-secrecy capacity with cost constraint (in the strongest and maximized
secrecy sense) as well as the pair of reliability and secrecy functions for the general wiretap channel,
and also for the stationary memoryless wiretap channel such as binary symmetric wiretap channels
(BSC), Gaussian wiretap channels and Poisson wiretap-channels. The key concept of the pair of
reliability exponent function and secrecy exponent function has played the crucial role throughout in
this paper.
Subsequently, we have introduced the formula for the δ-secrecy capacity as the strongest one among
others, which was invoked in many places in this paper when cost constraint is considered. Incidentally,
superiority of the maximum secrecy criterion to the average secrecy criterion was demonstrated.
Next, we have investigated in details one of typically important channels: the Poisson wiretap channel,
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whose secrecy-theoretic features have been clarified again from the viewpoint of the pair of reliability
and secrecy functions, where the formula for the δ-secrecy capacity also naturally followed from the
same point of view.
Similarly, also for the Gaussian wiretap channel it was possible to establish the δ-secrecy capacity
and the pair of reliability and secrecy functions as well, where we had four formulas for reliability
and secrecy functions depending on different upper bounding techniques on the characteristic function
χ(x) to ensure to satisfy the cost constraint: one of them is due to Gallager [11] and the other three
are demonstrated for the first time in this paper. These were shown to have two-folded dualities (cf.
Fig. 12). An open problem is left here to make clear the reason. The δ-secrecy capacity formula for
the Gaussian wiretap channel under the maximum criterion was shown to be stronger than that of
Cheong and Hellman [17] from the viewpoint of secrecy.
Moreover, we have introduced the concept of concatenation in order to expand performance of the
wiretap channel. Four ways to control the tradeoff between reliability and secrecy were shown to be
possible on the basis of rate shifting, rate exchange, concatenation, and change of cost constraint,
respectively.
Interestingly enough, it turned out that cost constraint Γ (with cost c(x)) on PXn of the concate-
nated channel (Wn+B ,W
n+
E ) is equivalent to cost constraint Γ (with cost c(v)) on the input PV n
of (Wn+B ,W
n+
E ), where c(v) =
∑
x∈X c(x)PX|V (x|v). This principle has enabled us to drastically
simplify the performance analysis of concatenated Poisson wiretap channels.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 3.1
First, set PV n = Q and generate a random code C = {V n1 , V n2 , · · · , V nMnLn} of size MnLn, where
V n1 , V
n
2 , · · · , V nMnLn are i.i.d. random variables with common distribution Q on Vn, and divide the
MnLn random codewords V n1 , V n2 , · · · , V nMnLn into Mn subcodes of equal size Ln so that
C1 = {V n1 , V n2 , · · · , V nLn},
C2 = {V nLn+1, · · · , V n2Ln},
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
CMn = {V nLn(Mn−1)+1, · · · , V nMnLn}. (A.1)
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In view of (3.6), we see that any realization of Xn1 ,Xn2 , · · · , XnMnLn over Xn induced via the auxiliary
channel PXn|V n by V n1 , V n2 , · · · , V nMnLn , respectively, satisfies cost constraint Γ.
For each message i ∈ Mn ≡ {1, 2, · · · ,Mn}, the stochastic encoder ϕn : Mn → Vn produces
the uniform distribution over Ci. The decoder ψBn : Yn → Mn tries to decode all of these MnLn
codewords V n1 , V n2 , · · · , V nMnLn . Then, the reliability formula for channel Wn+B : Vn → Yn:
EC[ǫ
B
n ] ≤ inf
0≤ρ≤1
(MnLn)
ρe−φ(ρ|W
n+
B ,Q) (A.2)
immediately follows from Gallager [11] with maximum likelihood decoding, where EC denotes the
expectation with respect to the random code C.
Next, for each i ∈ Mn we use the subcode Ci to produce an output distribution on Zn that
approximates enough the target output distribution πn on Zn generated via channel Wn+E : Vn → Zn
due to the input distribution PV n (i.e., πn(z) =
∑
v∈Vn W
n+
E (z|v)PV n(v)) (the resolvability ∗∗
problem). Let Uni be the random variable taking values uniformly in the subcode Ci, and let Zni be
the output via channel Wn+E due to the input Uni (i = 1, 2, · · · ,Mn), with the probability distribution
of Zni denoted by P
(i)
n . We now evaluate the degree of approximation in terms of the divergence
D(P
(i)
n ||πn). By symmetry of the subcodes, we can focus on the case i = 1 without loss of generality.
For notational simplicity, with PZn = πn, set
Wn = Wn+E , iV nWn(v, z) = log
Wn+E (z|v)
PZn(z)
.
Then, we have
EC1D(P
(1)
n ||πn)
=
∑
z∈Zn
∑
c1∈Vn
· · ·
∑
cLn∈V
n
PV n(c1) · · ·PV n(cLn)
· 1
Ln
Ln∑
j=1
Wn(z|cj) log
(
1
Ln
Ln∑
k=1
exp iV nWn(ck, z)
)
=
∑
c1∈Vn
· · ·
∑
cLn∈V
n
PV n(c1) · · ·PV n(cLn)
·
∑
z∈Zn
Wn(z|c1) log
(
1
Ln
Ln∑
k=1
exp iV nWn(ck, z)
)
∗∗Csisza´r [7] is the first who has looked at the secrecy problem with wiretap channels from the viewpoint of resolvability
devised by Han and Verdu´ [13].
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≤
∑
c1∈Vn
∑
z∈Zn
Wn(z|c1)PV n(c1)
· log
(
1
Ln
exp iV nWn(c1, z)
+
1
Ln
Ln∑
k=2
Eexp iV nWn(V
n
k , z)
)
≤ E
[
log
(
1 +
1
Ln
exp iV nWn(V
n, Zn)
)]
, (A.3)
where the first inequality follows from the concavity of the logarithm and the second one is a result
of
E[exp iV nWn(V
n
k , z)] = 1
for all z ∈ Zn and k = 1, 2, · · · , Ln. Now, apply a simple inequality with 0 < ρ ≤ 1 and x ≥ 0:
log(1 + x) =
log(1 + x)ρ
ρ
≤ log(1 + x
ρ)
ρ
≤ x
ρ
ρ
to (A.3) to eventaully obtain
EC1D(P
(1)
n ||πn) ≤ inf
0<ρ≤1
e−ψ(ρ|W
n+
E ,Q)
ρLρn
,
from which it follows that
EC
[
1
Mn
Mn∑
i=1
D(P (i)n ||πn)
]
≤ inf
0<ρ≤1
e−ψ(ρ|W
n+
E ,Q)
ρLρn
,
that is,
EC [δ
E
n ] ≤ inf
0<ρ≤1
e−ψ(ρ|W
n+
E ,Q)
ρLρn
. (A.4)
Thus, in view of (A.2) and (A.4) with Markov inequality, †† we conclude that there exists at least
one non-random pair (ϕn, ψBn ) of encoder (satisfying the cost constraint Γ) and decoder satisfying
(3.3), (3.4). Moreover, upper bound (3.5) comes from (3.4) and a simple inequality (due to Ho¨lder’s
inequality): (∑
v
Q(v)Wn+E (z|v)1+ρ
)
Wn+Q (z)
−ρ ≤
(∑
v
Q(v)Wn+E (z|v)
1
1−ρ
)1−ρ
(A.5)
for 0 ≤ ρ < 1, thereby completing the proof of the theorem.
††Markov inequality tells that Pr{ǫBn ≤ 2EC [ǫBn ]} > 1/2 and Pr{δEn ≤ 2EC [δEn ]} > 1/2 Hence, Pr{ǫBn ≤ 2EC [ǫBn ]
and δEn ≤ 2EC [δEn ]} > 0. This implies that there exists at least one realization of ǫBn and δEn satisfying (3.3) and (3.4).
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APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 3.3
Suppose that PX satisfies the condition
∑
x∈X PX(x)c(x) ≤ Γ, and define
χ(x) =

 1 for
∑n
i=1 c(xi) ≤ nΓ,
0 otherwise;
(B.1)
µn =
∑
x
χ(x)
n∏
i=1
PX(xi). (B.2)
It is easy to see that limn→∞ µn = 1 if
∑
x∈X PX(x)c(x) < Γ; and limn→∞ µn = 1/2 otherwise
(i.e., ∑x∈X PX(x)c(x) = Γ), by means of the central limit theorem. We rewrite µn as follows:
µn = PXn(Xn(Γ))
=
∑
v∈Vn
PXn|V n(Xn(Γ)|v)PV n(v), (B.3)
then, by means of Markov inequality ‡‡ there exists a subset T0 ⊂ Vn such that
αn
∆
= PV n(T0) ≥ 1−
√
1− µn ∆= βn, (B.4)
γn(v)
∆
= PXn|V n(Xn(Γ)|v) ≥ βn for all v ∈ T0. (B.5)
Obviously, limn→∞ αn = limn→∞ βn = limn→∞ γn(v) = 1 if
∑
x∈X PX(x)c(x) < Γ; otherwise
lim infn→∞ αn ≥ limn→∞ βn = 1 − 1/
√
2 and lim infn→∞ γn(v) ≥ 1 − 1/
√
2. Thus, we can
define
P˜V n(v) =
PV n(v)
αn
(v ∈ T0), (B.6)
P˜Xn|V n(x|v) =
PXn|V n(x|v)
γn(v)
(x ∈ Xn(Γ),v ∈ T0), (B.7)
which obviously specify a probability distribution and a conditional probability distribution. On the
other hand, notice that χ(x) can be upper bounded (for all x ∈ Xn) as
χ(x) ≤ exp
[
(1 + ρ)r
(
nΓ−
n∑
i=1
c(xi)
)]
, (B.8)
‡‡Markov inequality tells that if
∑
v∈V PX|V (X|v)PV (v) ≥ 1−κ then there exist a subset V0 ⊂ V such that PV (V0) ≥
1−√κ and PX|V (X|v) ≥ 1−
√
κ for all v ∈ V0.
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where r ≥ 0 is an arbitrary number. Now consider P˜V n(v) and P˜Xn|V n(x|v) as Q(v) in (3.3) and
PXn|V n(x|v) in (3.7), respectively, to obtain
ǫBn ≤
1
α1+ρn
(MnLn)
ρ
∑
y
(∑
v
PV n(v)W
n+
B (y|v)
1
1+ρ
)1+ρ
, (B.9)
and
Wn+B (y|v)
=
1
γn(v)
∑
x∈Xn(Γ)
WnB(y|x)PXn|V n(x|v)
=
1
γn(v)
∑
x∈Xn
WnB(y|x)χ(x)PXn|V n(x|v)
≤ 1
γn(v)
∑
x∈Xn
WnB(y|x) exp
[
(1 + ρ)r
(
nΓ−
n∑
i=1
c(xi)
)]
PXn|V n(x|v)
≤ 1
βn
∑
x∈Xn
WnB(y|x) exp
[
(1 + ρ)r
(
nΓ−
n∑
i=1
c(xi)
)]
PXn|V n(x|v),
(B.10)
which together with (3.16) ∼ (3.18) yields, with 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1,
ǫBn ≤
2
α1+ρn βn
(MnLn)
ρ
·

∑
y∈Y

∑
v∈V
q(v)
[∑
x∈X
WB(y|x)PX|V (x|v)e(1+ρ)r[Γ−c(x)]
] 1
1+ρ


1+ρ


n
,
(B.11)
Next, let us evaluate upper bound (3.5). In the way similar to the argument above with −ρ in place
of ρ, we obtain with 0 < ρ < 1:
δEn ≤
2
α1−ρn βn
1
ρLρn
·

∑
z∈Z

∑
v∈V
q(v)
[∑
x∈X
WE(z|x)PX|V (x|v)e(1−ρ)r[Γ−c(x)]
] 1
1−ρ


1−ρ


n
.
(B.12)
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APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 3.1
We first show Assertion 1). It follows from (3.25) that
Fc(q,RB , RE ,+∞)
≡ sup
r≥0
sup
0≤ρ≤1
(φ(ρ|WB , q, r) − ρ(RB +RE)) . (C.1)
Let us first consider the condition for the sup0≤ρ≤1 on the right-hand side of (C.1) to be attained at
ρ = 0, which is obviously
∂
∂ρ
φ(ρ|WB , q, r)
∣∣∣∣∣
ρ=0
= RB + RE. (C.2)
Furthermore, in order to fix the value of r to attain supr≥0 under the condition ρ = 0, set
f(r)
∆
= φ(ρ = 0|WB , q, r)
= − log

∑
y∈Y
∑
v∈V
q(v)
∑
x∈X
WB(y|x)PX|V (x|v)er[Γ−c(x)]


= − log
[∑
x∈X
PX(x)e
r[Γ−c(x)]
]
. (C.3)
Then, setting
A =
∑
x∈X
PX(x)e
r[Γ−c(x)],
B =
∑
x∈X
PX(x)(Γ− c(x))er[Γ−c(x)],
C =
∑
x∈X
P (x)(Γ− c(x))2er[Γ−c(x)],
we have
f ′(r) = −B
A
, (C.4)
f ′′(r) = −AC −B
2
A2
≤ 0, (C.5)
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where the last step follows from Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and this means that f(r) is concave. .
On the other hand, from (C.3) and (C.4) we have
f(0) = 0, (C.6)
f ′(0) = −
∑
x∈X
PX(x)(Γ− c(x))
= −
(
Γ−
∑
x∈X
P (x)c(x)
)
≤ 0, (C.7)
where the last step comes from the assumed condition. Therefore, we conclude from (C.5) ∼ (C.7)
that f(r) attains the maximum value zero at r = 0. Then, equation (C.2) reduces to
∂
∂ρ
φ(ρ|WB , q, r = 0)
∣∣∣∣∣
ρ=0
= RB +RE . (C.8)
On the other hand, it is easy to see that the left-hand side is equal to I(q,W+B ), and thus Assertion
1) was proved. In the same way Assertion 2) can also be shown, using, instead of (C.1),
Hc(q,RE ,+∞)
≡ sup
r≥0
sup
0<ρ<1
(φ(−ρ|WE , q, r) + ρRE) . (C.9)
Next consider about Assertion 3). In view of the form of the right-hand side of (C.1), we can invoke
the same argument as in Gallager [11] to conclude that Fc(q,RB , RE ,+∞) is monotone strictly
decreasing convex function of RB + RE for RB + RE < I(q,W+B ), from which combined with
Assertion 1) the positivity follows. Similarly for Assertion 4).
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors are grateful to Vincent Tan, Ryutaro Matsumoto for valuable discussions to improve the
earlier manuscript. They are also indebted to Associate Editor and Reviewers for their helpful critical
comments which have occasioned to make an indeed major revision of the ealier manuscript.
REFERENCES
[1] A. D. Wyner, “The wire-tap channel,” Bell Syst. Tech. J., vol.54, pp.1355-1387, 1975
[2] I. Csisza´r and J. Ko¨rner, “Broadcast channels with confidential messages,” IEEE Transactions Information Theory,
vol.24, no.3, pp.339-348, 1978
60
[3] A. Laourine and A. B. Wagner, “The degraded Poisson wiretap channel,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory,
vol.IT-58, no.12, pp.7073-7085, 2012
[4] M. Hayashi, “Exponential decreasing rate of leaked information in universal random privacy amplification,” IEEE
Transactions on Information Theory, vol.IT-57, no.6, pp. 3989-4001, 2011
[5] T.M. Cover and J.A. Thomas, Elements of Information Theory, 2nd ed., Wiley, New York, 2006
[6] M. Hayashi, “General nonasymptotic and asymptotic formulas in channel resolvability and identification capacity and
their application to the wiretap channel,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol.IT-52, no.4, pp. 1562-1575,
2006
[7] I. Csisza´r, “Almost independence and secrecy capacity,” Problems of Information Transmission, vol.32, no.1, pp.
40-47, 1996
[8] J. Hou and G. Kramer, “Effective secrecy: reliability, confusion and stealth,” ArX: 1311.1411v3 [cs.IT], Jan. 2014
[9] I. Csisza´r and J. Ko¨rner, Information Theory: Coding Theorems for Discrete Memoryless Systems, 2nd ed., Cambridge
University Press, 2011
[10] M.S. Pinsker, Information and Information Stability of Random Variables and Processes, Holden-Day, San Francisco,
1964
[11] R. G. Gallager, Information Theory and Reliable Communication, Hoboken, NJ, Wiley, 1968
[12] T. S. Han, Information Spectrum Methods in Information Theory, Springer, New York, 2003
[13] T. S. Han and S. Verdu´, “Approximation theory of output statistics,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory,
vol.IT-399, no.3, pp. 752-772, 1993
[14] M.R. Bloch and J.N.Laneman, “Strong secrecy from channel resolvability,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory,
vol.IT-59, no.12, pp. 8077-8098, 2013
[15] A. D. Wyner, “Capacity and error exponent for the direct detection photon channel–Part I,” IEEE Transactions on
Information Theory, vol.IT-34, no.6, pp.1449-1461, 1988
[16] A. Lapidoth, E. Telater and R. Urbanke, “On wide-band broadcast channels,” IEEE Transactions on Information
Theory, vol.IT-49, no.12, pp. 3250-3258, 2003
[17] S.K.Lueng-Yan-Cheong and M.Hellamn, “The Gaussian wire-tap channel,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory,
vol.IT-24, no.4, pp.451-456, 1978
[18] Tie Liu and P. Vithwanath, “An extremal inequality motivated by multi terminal information-theoretic problems,”
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol.IT-53, no.5, pp.1839-1851, 2007
